Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2: From Lincoln to Garfield, with a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860Blaine, James Gillespie
History
Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2: From Lincoln to Garfield, with a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860
Blaine, James Gillespie
United States -- History; United States -- History -- 1865-1898
The same lack of moral courage to face the inevitable and deal frankly
with friends and supporters was still more palpably shown by Jefferson
Davis when he sent a message to the Confederate Congress on March 13,
three weeks before the fall of Richmond, in a tone similar to that of
the famous address. Even after he was a fugitive, and the Capital of
the Confederacy was in the possession of the Union Army, Mr. Davis
halted long enough at Danville, to issue a proclamation in which he
said, "We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved
from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be
free to move from point to point to strike the enemy in detail far from
his base. Let us but will it, and we are free. . . . Let us not
despond, my countrymen, but, relying on God, meet the foe with fresh
defiance, with unconquered and unconquerable hearts." It is clearly
established that Mr. Davis was fully aware of the state of affairs
when he issued this misleading and inexcusable proclamation. Four
days after its publication the army upon which he relied even for
personal protection surrendered to General Grant, and Mr. Davis again
sought safety in flight.
These extravagant misrepresentations do infinite damage to the
Confederate cause and to the Confederate leaders in history. They
reveal in strong light the method by which those leaders were
willing to impose and actually did impose upon the almost unlimited
credulity of the white population of their States. Prejudice on the
question of slavery could be easily stimulated, and no effort was
spared to poison the minds of the Southern people against the National
Government and against the Northern people. But the exaggerations at
the close of the struggle were no greater than those which had been
employed at its commencement. From beginning to end the Rebellion was
based upon the suppression of that which was true and the suggestion of
that which was untrue. To mete out the proper share of responsibility
to the leaders who organized the insurrection would be a task at once
ungracious and impossible. The aggressive character of the movement
was not concealed, and the motives underlying it were understood. That
which was not understood, and which still remains to be accounted for,
was the conduct of the thousands of Southern Unionists who did not
express their opinions and maintain their faith with the firmness and
effectiveness which had been widely hoped for and expected in the
North. From the timidity of the friends of the Union and the boldness
of the advocates of Secession, it is not difficult to understand how
the large class of poor whites in the South could be urged into a
contest in which every blow struck by them was in support of a system
to whose baleful influence they owed their own ignorance, their social
degradation, their pitiable poverty.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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