Two Years on Trek: Being Some Account of the Royal Sussex Regiment in South AfricaDu Moulin, Louis Eugène
History
Two Years on Trek: Being Some Account of the Royal Sussex Regiment in South Africa
Du Moulin, Louis Eugène
Great Britain. Army. Royal Sussex Regiment; South African War, 1899-1902 -- Regimental histories -- Great Britain
The next morning we had some conversation with the prisoners, one or two
of whom spoke English. They were the usual farm hand sort of type, some
of them being young lads, of about the stamp of the recruits whom we
get. They did not seem to mind having been captured, and were very
grateful for what tobacco, coffee and other little luxuries we could
give them.
One of them told me that the Maxim fire was terrible--_they dared not
put their heads up to fire_.
I have never forgotten that remark, since the man made it to me, and
there is a great deal in it to which the attention of company officers
and section leaders might with advantage be drawn. The main point is
that we Infantry do not fire nearly enough ammunition when delivering an
attack. Of course we see no enemy: we only hear the crack of his rifle
and the whiz of his bullets: but we sometimes see the splash of the
bullet on the ground, and can from that obtain some slight idea of his
position at the time. Having found that, a constant hail of bullets
should be directed at all parts of the position, high and low, at rocks,
at bushes and at all places likely to afford a hiding spot, with the
object always in view of making the enemy keep his head down behind his
cover.
For this purpose volley firing is useless, and what should be adopted is
controlled individual firing, using the magazine _always_, and refilling
it behind cover when, and as often as, an opportunity occurs of so
doing. There should be no breaks or intervals, either in the firing or
in the advance: the latter should be continuous, as in the old
skirmishing days, until the last possible moment, when, if the men
cannot advance any further, they should take cover and employ themselves
in firing as rapidly as possible.
The wretched system of false economy in the use of blank ammunition at
instructional field days, when a man carries perhaps five rounds in his
pouch and five in reserve, is responsible for the fact that men cannot
be got to fire fast enough in the field, and that they lie under cover
and husband their ammunition, firing only occasional shots, as they
have been taught in peace time. They forget that they are now more
widely extended than formerly and that one man now occupies as much
space as was formerly allotted to five, and that he should, therefore,
fire five times as fast as before. The present system of widely extended
lines is merely what was learned by the troops employed in the Chitral
and Tirah expeditions, two or three years ago; and the system of
fighting adopted by the Afridis is practically the same as that used by
the Boers in the Free State and the Transvaal.
Owing to the widely extended lines adopted by us in our advance at Zand
River, and to the steady shelling by the batteries which the enemy
received during the attack, our casualties were not very heavy.[3]
The following order was published by the General on the day after the
battle:--
Twistniet, Zand River,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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