[42] U. S. Military Academy, Dept of Mil Art and Eng (U. S. MilAcad), _Operations in Korea_ (West Point, 1953), 4–5. It is noteworthy that this list was limited to light arms for a constabulary of about 50,000 men. Tanks, military aircraft and medium or heavy artillery were significantly lacking. At the request of the ROK government, a Korean Military Advisory Group remained in South Korea after the conclusion of the American occupation. Composed of 500 United States Army officers and enlisted men, the KMAG took on the task of directing the training of a ROK constabulary. The group was under the control of Ambassador Muccio, since General MacArthur’s responsibility for the defense had ended along with the occupation.[43] [43] _Ibid._ After the NKPA invasion, the United States was severely criticized in some quarters for failing to provide the Republic of Korea with arms and training equal to those of the enemy. American reluctance was due in some measure to indiscreet declarations by that fiery old Korean patriot, Syngman Rhee. The ROK president, 74 years old at the outbreak of civil war, did not shrink from advocating the unification of Korea by armed force. On 20 February 1949 he predicted that his troops “could defeat North Korea within 2 weeks” if the U. S. S. R. did not interfere. Eight months later, on 7 October, his confidence had increased to the point where he was “sure that we could take Pyongyang in 3 days.”[44] [44] A. Wigfall Green, _Epic of Korea_ (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950), 125–26. Such remarks placed the United States in an uncomfortable position. If aid to the Republic of Korea were to include tanks, military aircraft and training for offensive warfare, Americans would be open to the charge of inciting civil strife. Communist propagandists would scream that accusation in any event, of course, but there would be grounds for the suspicion of other members of the United Nations. Ambassador Muccio made sure, therefore, that United States assistance did not extend beyond the legitimate needs of ROK frontier defense and internal security. The triangular ROK infantry division was modeled after the United States unit but numbered about 9,500 troops. Eight divisions and a regiment had been organized and partially trained by June 1950. They were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions and the 17th Regiment.[45] Only 4 of these divisions, the 1st, 2d, 6th, and 7th, had their full complement of 3 regiments. All the others had 2 except the 5th, which had 2 and a battalion.[46] [45] The absence of a 4th Division is explained by an old Korean superstition. Because the symbol for that number resembled the ancient symbol for death, it was regarded as unlucky. Apparently the North Koreans managed to overcome this superstition, however, in numbering their units.