The answer is that the Marines actually were the first United States ground forces to get into the fight after completing the long voyage from the American mainland. There were no Marine units of any size in the Far East at the outset of the invasion. But not an hour was lost at the task of assembling an air-ground team at Camp Pendleton, California, and collecting the shipping. The spirit of impatience animating the Marine Corps is shown by an entry on the desk calendar of General Clifton B. Cates under the date of 26 June 1950. This was the day after the news of the invasion reached Washington, and the Commandant commented: “SecNav’s policy meeting called off. Nuts.”[57] [57] Gen Clifton B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54 (Cates, 7 Apr 54). On the 28th General Cates had his first conference with Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He noted on his calendar the next day: “Recommended to CNO and SecNav that FMF be employed.” Two days later General Cates “attended SecNav’s conference.” And on 3 July his calendar recorded more history: “Attended JCS meeting. Orders for employment of FMF approved.”[58] [58] _Ibid._ The steps leading up to this decision may be traced back to the conference of 28 June, when Cates gave Sherman a summary of the strength of the Marine Corps. Along with other branches of the service, it had taken cuts in appropriations since World War II, so that total numbers were 74,279 men on active duty--97 percent of authorized strength. The Fleet Marine Force had a strength of 27,656--11,853 in FMFPac (1st Marine Division, Reinf., and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing) and 15,803 in FMFLant (2d Marine Division, Reinf., and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing).[59] [59] Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict_ (Washington, HQMC, G-3, HistSec, 1951), 1–2. Neither of these understrength divisions, General Cates pointed out, could raise much more than an RCT of combat-ready troops with supporting air. Admiral Sherman asked CinCPacFlt on 1 July how long it would take to move (_a_) a Marine BLT and (_b_) a Marine RCT from the Pacific Coast. Admiral Radford replied the next day that he could load the BLT in 4 days and sail in 6; and that he could load the RCT in 6 days and sail in 10.[60] [60] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 1 Jul 50; and CinCPacFlt disp to CNO, 2 Jul 50. Next, a dispatch from CNO to Admiral C. Turner Joy announced that a Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired it. COMNAVFE called personally on the general, who had just returned from a depressing inspection of the invasion front. Not only did CINCFE accept immediately, but he showed unusual enthusiasm in expressing his appreciation.[61] [61] Marine Corps Board, _An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War_ (4 Aug-15 Dec 50) (MCBS) I-B-1, I-B-2.