U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
LST 857 ran into a ROK PC boat while heading in toward the beach,
but no harm was done to either vessel. Hits from NKPA mortar and
machine-gun fire punctured eight drums of gasoline without any of them
bursting into flame. This was one of the LSTs which fired back at
enemy gun flashes. During the exchange a sailor was killed and another
knocked unconscious when an enemy projectile damaged one of the LST’s
gun mounts.
LST 859, which had a sailor wounded by enemy mortar fragments, hit
RED Beach with all guns blazing away. When the vessel beached, it was
immediately boarded by Marines who helped themselves to ammunition
while shouting to sailors in the well deck to stop firing. The same
message was slammed home more authoritatively when First Lieutenant
William J. Peter, Jr., appeared on deck, as directed by Lieutenant
Colonel Newton, and demanded that the LST’s guns cease at once.[174]
[174] MSgt B. W. Gifford interv, 17 Nov 54; Col G. R. Newton
memo to authors, 16 Apr 55; LCdr D. Weidemeyer memo to
authors, 12 Apr 55.
This put an end to the bombardment of shore positions. “No LSTs fired
after my ship beached,” commented Lieutenant Trumond E. Houston, USN,
commander of LST 799 at the extreme left of the line. “Earlier LSTs
beaching had opened fire on targets unknown to me, but my command had
received very firm orders not to open fire due to the danger of firing
into our own forces.”[175]
[175] LCdr T. E. Houston ltr to authors, 8 Mar 55.
As dusk shaded into darkness, the Marines on and around Cemetery Hill
extended their lines into the city. Even at the climax of the military
drama there was an unexpected note of comedy--assault troops were to
discover shortly that among the ammunition brought by the LSTs, some
useless .22 caliber cartridges testified to the haste of departure from
Camp Pendleton.[176] There was enough M-1 ammunition, however, so that
the enemy had no cause to complain of being neglected by the Marines.
[176] SSgt H. M. Grenell interv, 15 Nov 54.
_Supplies on RED and BLUE Beaches_
It was absolutely essential that the LSTs unload in time to retract
on the morning high tide and allow other cargo vessels to take their
places. This meant an all-night job for the 1st Shore Party Battalion,
which was to initiate unloading on both beaches for the organization
composed also of the 1st Combat Service Group, the 7th Motor Transport
Battalion, and the U. S. Army 2d Engineer Special Brigade, with the
latter in control.
The vehicles came off the LSTs first--about 450 of them, all told--and
darkness had fallen when the unloading of cargo got into full swing.
Congestion on the 650-foot strip of beach did not permit normal
location and employment of dumps. It was catch-as-catch-can for the
shore party troops and engineers, with the cargo being off-loaded
and stockpiled wherever space could be found. Later, as the tactical
situation improved, designated dumps were established.
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