U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Crossman acknowledged this message but replied that he could not reach
the river bank for nearly an hour. He had assigned the three objectives
to his platoon commanders, directing that they take their orders from
Houghton upon reaching the other bank. SCR-300 communications were
frequently blurred, however, or blasted off the air altogether by
the more powerful radios of the tractors. Thus the possibilities for
confusion were multiplied as the nine amtracs proceeded in column
to the embarkation point, clanking and revving up thunderously in
preparation for the crossing.[292]
[292] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
The din was deafening enough to arouse even an enemy who had not shown
much fight so far in the zone of RCT-5. Hill 125 suddenly came to life
as NKPA bullets whipped the water and mortar shells exploded among
the LVTs or along the beach occupied by Houghton’s swimmers. Although
Cashion’s patrol reported no enemy encountered on Hill 125, his men
came under fire from that quarter on their return to the beach. One
of them, Private First Class Alphonse O. Ledet, Jr., was reported as
missing in action, and it was assumed that Communists bullets had cut
him down.[293]
[293] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
The embarkation area was so cramped that Crossman had found it
necessary to send the LVTs across the river in column, with First
Lieutenant Francis R. Kraince’s 1st Platoon in the lead, followed by
Second Lieutenant Philip D. Shutler’s 2d Platoon and the 3d commanded
by Second Lieutenant Charles Puckett. Kraince was to seize Hill 125
while Shutler attacked Hill 51 and Puckett went up against Hill 95.
The three platoons were accompanied by a 4.2-inch mortar forward
observer team, two 105mm FO teams from the 11th Marines, and a squad
of engineers. Communications on the SCR-300 net were so badly jammed,
however, that Houghton and Crossman were figuratively as well as
literally in the dark on opposite sides of the river. Crossman’s final
messages from Kraince and Shutler reported that four of their amtracs
had drifted from the course and grounded in the mud. He ordered both
officers to extricate themselves while Puckett, who had not yet left
the south bank, covered them with fire. Just then DeFazio radioed that
Houghton and his team were planning to swim to the LVTs. This was the
last word from the north bank received by Crossman, who lost all radio
contact afterwards with anyone except the 5th Marines.[294]
[294] Crossman ltr, 23 Nov 54.
At the height of the pandemonium on the north bank, the two Korean
prisoners attempted to escape. Both were killed by Marines of the
swimming team.[295]
[295] Houghton interv, 3 Aug 54; DeFazio ltr, 11 Dec 54.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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