On the left of the highway, 3/1 jumped off from Hill 123 with Companies H and I in the assault. The battalion’s mission was to clear a rambling ridge complex that extended more than three miles before stopping short of Hill 118. Assigned as a final objective was the terminal height, Lookout Hill, facing western Yongdungpo across the wide bottomland of the Kalchon.[322] [322] _Ibid._; and 1st MarDiv _C/S Journal, 15–20 Sep 50_. Considering the formidable cross-compartment approach, the assault companies led by the battalion S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, made good progress against enemy resistance described as “light but stubborn.” At a cost of two killed and 15 wounded, the Marines combed the vertical wilderness and seized Lookout Hill late in the evening. The attack was almost too successful, for the battalion was now out on a limb. The closest friendly forces were on Hill 118, several hundred yards to the north, and along the Inchon-Seoul Highway, about a mile to the south, as will be shown.[323] [323] _Ibid._; and Myers interv, 1 Feb 55. The 2d Battalion could boast comparable success along the highway in the course of 19 September, but gains were made under far different circumstances. Spearheaded by Charlie Company Tanks commanded by Captain Richard M. Taylor, the battalion had advanced only 500 yards in the morning when the lead M-26 was enveloped in a violent explosion. With one track and two road wheels destroyed, the steel monster settled into the crater left by the detonation of a wooden box mine.[324] [324] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe. Simultaneously, the infantrymen of Company F came under heavy small-arms fire from Hill 72 to the right front. In an attempt to sight in on the enemy positions, other tanks tried to bypass the mine field in the highway, only to discover that explosives were concealed in both road shoulders as well. Howitzers of the 11th Marines registered on Hill 72, and during the ensuing bombardment a VMF-214 flight appeared overhead to lend further assistance.[325] [325] 2/1 _SAR_; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Jig; Easy; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. Despite his generous use of supporting arms, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter was forced to commit all three rifle companies to the fight. Tank gunners tried to detonate mines embedded in the road with machine-gun fire, but without success.[326] It remained for First Lieutenant George A. Babe’s 2d Platoon, Charlie Company Engineers, to remove the obstacles under fire. Darting forward on the bullet-swept highway, the engineers placed “snowball” charges of C-3 on the wooden boxes, then took cover while the mines exploded.[327] [326] Owing to the crude design, the top of the wooden box mine must protrude above the road for best effect. Although the Communists sometimes concealed the projections with debris, Marines usually had no difficulty in spotting them.