[327] Capt G. A. Babe--1stLt P. Paolino interv, 15 Nov 54. After 2/1 had driven the enemy from the area with the assistance of Marine air and artillery, the job of clearing the 250-yard mine field proceeded under less hair-raising conditions. To get the armor back into the fight as soon as possible, Babe ignored the explosives embedded in the highway shoulders. Word was passed back to this effect, but several jeeps and trucks were lost later when drivers failed to heed the warning.[328] [328] _Ibid._; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter. While the tanks remained on the sideline, Companies D and F punched about a mile down the highway against continuing resistance, which gradually solidified at Hill 146. Like 72, this ridge was on the right side of the road, in the 32d Infantry’s zone of action. Since the Army unit had yet to enter the picture, the Marine flank was becoming more and more exposed with each forward bound by 2/1.[329] [329] 2/1 _SAR_; and Sutter-Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55. Sutter had no choice but to commit troops beyond his zone. Not only were the Reds entrenched on Hill 146 with machine guns and field pieces, but they had blocked the highway with trees and other encumbrances. Thus, while Fox Company seized a knoll on the left, Dog Company invaded Army territory and battled its way to the top of Hill 146’s western spur. VMF-214 plastered the peak itself, and the 11th Marines shelled enemy positions across the whole battalion front.[330] [330] _Ibid._; and Cunliffe interv, 24 Aug 54. It was 1300 when the mine field to the rear was finally cleared, enabling Charlie Company Tanks to move forward in an attempt to overtake Sutter’s infantry. Within sight of the fighting around Hill 146, the armor ground to a halt before the roadblock of trees, rice bags, and other debris.[331] A dozer tank rumbled ahead, smashed through the first obstruction, then went up in a cloud of smoke. Under the litter on the road lay a second mine field, 75 yards long.[332] [331] Rice bags filled with dirt commonly were used by the NKPA for barriers in place of sandbags. [332] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Oboe Oboe. Again the tank men watched from behind as engineers cleared the highway and 2/1 drove forward out of sight. By 1730, the Marine infantry had completely smashed the main enemy concentration on the highway. When the surviving Reds fled, they exhibited the same determination that had characterized their stand throughout the day. Weapons and equipment were strewn along the road, and the Marines captured a truck loaded with mines as further evidence of the hasty retreat.[333] [333] _Ibid._; and 2/1 _SAR_.