U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
On the morning of the 23d the 1st KMC Battalion was directed to attack
from Hill 104 at 0700 to straighten out the line. The 1st and 3d
Battalions of the 5th Marines were to remain in position and assist the
advance by fire.
Heavy and immediate resistance was encountered from NKPA troops dug
in on Hill 56. Although the KMCs made a valiant effort, they were
soon stopped cold. Only slight gains resulted at an excessive cost in
casualties from artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire.[370]
[370] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.
Lieutenant Colonel Roise moved his CP forward at 1300 to the western
base of Hill 104. While his 2d Battalion assembled under cover of that
height, he conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Murray after receiving
orders to pass through the KMCs and continue the attack on Hill 56.
Both officers realized the advantages of swinging around to hit the
enemy from the left after approaching along the low ground. But it was
already midafternoon and this movement could not be completed before
darkness. The only alternative was a line-buck in the center if Hill
56 was to be taken that day. And since the line had to be stabilized
and the KMCs pulled back in reserve to give the regimental defense some
depth, Murray and Roise agreed that the situation called for a frontal
assault without delay.[371]
[371] LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 9 Nov 54.
At this stage the Marine officers did not realize that Hill 56 was
part of the enemy’s main line of resistance. It seemed logical to them
that he would make his final stand on the next ridgeline, crowned with
Hills 105-C and 105-N. As for the repulses suffered by the KMCs, it was
a logical assumption that their inexperience had been a contributing
factor. In view of these circumstances, a brief artillery preparation
and the support of a platoon of tanks seemed sufficient when Companies
D and F attacked and E contributed fires from the eastern slopes of
Hill 104.[372]
[372] _Ibid._
Captain Peters’ Fox Company was to lead off on the right, south of the
railroad, and seize the portion of the objective below the railroad
tunnel. From this high ground, his men could then support First
Lieutenant H. J. Smith’s Dog Company, moving forward under cover of a
sunken road, to assault Hill 56 north of the tunnel. About 1,000 yards
of rice paddies had to be crossed at the outset, and the expected
support of the tanks in this low ground failed to materialize. The
leading M-26 bogged down in a wide ditch which prevented the advance of
the other four. One of them remained in the paddies to give supporting
fires while three took a new route along the railroad tracks. Fox
Company received increasingly heavy casualties meanwhile on the way
across the low ground.
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