U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Sutter’s unit completed the passage of lines at 0900 and attacked along
the boulevard with Fox and Easy Companies in the assault. Leading the
advance up the street were the tanks of Baker Company, Cummings’ M-26
in the van. The young officer’s machine had proceeded only a few yards
when it struck an American M6 mine, overlooked by Marine engineers
while they were removing their hasty field of the previous night. Not
only did the explosion wreck the tank, but it also caused several
casualties among the infantry on either side.
The attack edged forward in the second day of the “Battle of the
Barricades.” Every 200–300 yards, fanatical Red detachments manned
rice-bag barriers about eight feet high and five feet thick,
stretching the whole width of the street. It fell to the M-26s to
smash the emplacements and silence the NKPA antitank guns behind each
one. Marine tank action in turn hinged on mine clearance by supporting
engineers, who looked to flanking infantry for covering fire. Thus was
a system of three-party teamwork developed and perfected during the
roar of battle.
Aiding the Communists behind the barricades were other North Koreans
who fired their rifles and submachine guns from roof tops, windows,
and side streets. The Marine infantry, therefore, had to defend in
every direction as it attacked to the front. Intense heat from burning
buildings along the street added to the handicaps, and the constant
discovery of South Korean civilians, including women and children,
huddled in the rubble further strained the taut nerves of men who
looked for trouble from every quarter.
It was a dirty, frustrating fight every yard of the way, perhaps
best described by Puller himself, who reported that “progress was
agonizingly slow.” A principal deterrent to speed was the fact that all
supporting tanks simultaneously expended their ammunition and fuel,
so that all had to return to the rear for replenishment at the same
time. During their absences from the fight, the infantry understandably
chose to await their return rather than pay heavily in casualties by
assaulting barricades with small arms alone.
At one point in the street battle, an enemy soldier darted from behind
a building and charged a flame tank advancing behind two lead M-26s.
Ignoring the Marine infantrymen, who gaped in disbelief, the North
Korean hurled a huge satchel charge over the engine compartment of the
armored vehicle, then escaped unharmed as the explosion rocked the
area. The flame tank was wrecked, but the crew escaped serious injury
with the assistance of supporting infantry. Apparently a suicide squad
of NKPA demolitions men had been assigned the mission of destroying
Marine armor in this fashion, for several other Red soldiers tried
single-handed assaults shortly afterwards. The riflemen of 2/1 were
alert for the later attempts, however, and the enemy fanatics were cut
down before inflicting further damage.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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