U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Two road blocks were cleared before the battalion tied in for the night
on high ground just short of the objective. Then, at 0230 the next
morning, the enemy struck in estimated company strength. The attempt
was repulsed by machine-gun fire, and 67 Red Korean bodies were found
at daybreak in the attack area. At 0700 the column resumed the march to
Suyuhyon, which was occupied without further incident.[462]
[462] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen: basic rpt and
Peter.
The 1st Marines found little difficulty in carrying out all missions
assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. In fact, the regiment had only a few
minor patrol actions after taking blocking positions northeast of Seoul.
Colonel Litzenberg’s men were now making the main effort of the 1st
Marine Division. Preparations for the drive to Uijongbu began with
every indication that the enemy was bent upon flight. A patrol from the
3d Battalion found 30 Korean bodies beside a wall, including several
women and a child, whose hands had been bound behind them before
they were shot. The victims, according to a POW, were members of the
families of ROK soldiers.[463]
[463] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger.
Positions had been consolidated by the late afternoon of 30 September
in readiness for the jump-off in the morning. The 7th Marines might
well have been called Task Force Litzenberg at this stage for it was
reinforced by Major Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines, Captain
Lester T. Chase’s Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion, Captain Byron
C. Turner’s Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion, and Captain Kim’s
Company C of the 5th KMC Battalion.
The drive to the new objective began at 0630 on 1 October in a column
of battalions. Air reconnaissance had made it appear likely that any
NKPA resistance would probably take advantage of a tactical bottleneck,
about halfway to Uijongbu, where steep and rocky ridges overlooked a
narrow defile through which the road passed. Colonel Litzenberg and his
staff decided to maneuver by sending the 1st Battalion to make a broad
feint to cover the entry of the 3d Battalion into the defile with tank
support while the 2d Battalion followed in reserve.
Lieutenant Colonel Davis secured his preliminary objectives, then
swiftly spread out on both sides of the defile for his feint.
Unfortunately, Major Roach was delayed by an enemy mine field, which
brought the 3d Battalion and the tanks to a halt while the engineers
cleared the way. Davis’ simulated attack had meanwhile disclosed that
the enemy was entrenched in depth along the high ground on each side of
the defile. Both Marine battalions took heavy NKPA artillery and mortar
fire before halting for the night.[464]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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