U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Appointed to his new command only nine days before, he was motoring
from the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico to the West Coast. From
Yellowstone Park he advised Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, of his readiness to proceed to Hawaii and
the Far East. His offer was accepted, and a Marine plane from El Toro
transported him from Salt Lake City to San Francisco. There he boarded
the first available plane to Pearl Harbor, arriving in the early
morning hours of 2 July.[1]
[1] FMFPac _Historical Diary, 1–31 Aug 50_.
On this date, with the Korean conflict only a week old, the armed
forces of the United States were already committed. From the outset
the United Nations had viewed the Red Korean invasion of the Republic
of Korea as a challenge issued to free nations by World Communism. The
so-called North Korean People’s Republic had been set up after World
War II as a Communist puppet state, and the army of invasion was both
trained and armed by Soviet Russia.
More than half of the troops in the original North Korean People’s Army
(NKPA) were veterans of the victorious Chinese Communist forces in the
Chinese Civil War. Weapons and equipment, all the way from T-34 tanks
to Tokarev pistols, had been made available by the Soviet Union; and
Soviet instructors prepared the invading army for its surprise attack
of 25 June on the Republic of Korea.[2]
[2] For a more detailed account of the organization of the
NKPA and ROK forces, see v. I of this series, _The Pusan
Perimeter_, ch. II.
There could have been little doubt as to the outcome. Although the ROK
army included eight divisions and a regiment, estimated at some 98,000
men in all, it could not compare with the NKPA establishment of about
equal numbers. The difference lay in the purposes for which the two
forces had been organized during the joint Soviet-American occupation
of Korea after World War II. While Red Army officers created the NKPA
as an instrument of aggression, American instructors trained the ROK
troops for frontier defense and internal security. They had neither
tanks nor combat aircraft, and their heaviest artillery consisted of a
few battalions of 105mm howitzers. It was scarcely more than a lightly
armed constabulary which crumpled at the first shock of NKPA columns
led by Soviet-made tanks and supported by Soviet-made bombing planes.
The four ROK divisions deployed along the frontier were routed, and
Seoul fell to the invaders on the third day.
The reaction of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. On 27 June
the UN Security Council denounced the NKPA attack as a breach of world
peace and called upon member nations to aid the Republic of Korea. The
United States and 52 other nations approved this resolution, which was
opposed only by the Soviet Union and two of its satellites.[3]
[3] US Dept of State, _Guide to the U. N. in Korea_
(Washington, 1951).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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