U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
+---------+
| CinCFE |
+----+----+
|
+----+----+
|ComNavFE |
+----+----+
|
+----+----+
| CJTF-7 |
+----+----+
|
+---------+--------+
| |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| CTF-90 | |CG X Corps |
+-----+----+ +-----+-----+
| |
+---------+---------+--------+--------+
| | |
+------+-------+ +-------+------+ +------+-------+
| ComPhibGru-1 | |CG 7th Inf Div| |CG 1st Mar Div|
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
The movement of JTF-7 to the objective area was planned in the most
exacting detail, owing to the dispersion of the ships to begin with,
the need for secrecy, and the limited time. Another complication
entered the picture at the last minute, when a second typhoon loomed on
the Pacific horizon with considerably more menace than its exotic name
would imply.
Navy meteorologists had been plotting the movement of Typhoon KEZIA
since the first signs of turbulence near the Marianas Islands on 6
September. Generating winds of 100 miles per hour three days later,
the typhoon was churning a steady course toward the East China Sea and
Tsushima Strait, where it was expected to hit on 12 or 13 September.
The timing could not have been worse as far as Admiral Doyle and
General Smith were concerned. KEZIA threatened to strike the ships
of the task force during the last stages of embarkation and the
first phase of the approach to Inchon. And any serious disruption of
the Navy’s delicate timetable would place the 15 September deadline
hopelessly beyond reach.
With the carriers, cruisers, and destroyers scheduled to be in the
Yellow Sea, beyond the path of the storm, Admiral Doyle’s amphibious
vessels were the most imperiled elements. The Attack Force Commander
planned to move his ships to the objective area in six increments,
three of them loading in Japan, one in Pusan, and two at both places
simultaneously. Because of the last two, certain rendezvous areas
were designated so that fragments of a group could converge at sea to
form the whole. Obviously, then, the mathematics of navigation was a
dominant factor. Success hinged on coordination in terms of hours, not
weeks or days.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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