That the attack did not go off as planned stemmed from a series of mishaps which began as far out as the line of departure. Despite the fact that Lieutenant Commander Schneeloch was using standard control procedures from the _Bass_, including radio contact with the beach, there was a mixing of waves starting with number four.[146] This development reflected the lack of a rehearsal in the hurried preparations for the operation, and the end result was that parts of Companies C and D, both in the second assault echelon, landed over the wrong beaches.[147] After landing, Charlie Company had the added disadvantage of being without its company commander for a crucial 12 minutes. Captain Poul F. Pedersen was delayed when the fifth-wave commander, who shared his boat, decided to tow a stalled LCVP left behind by the preceding formation.[148] When he finally reached his company, the job of reorganization was much more difficult than it would have been had he arrived at the beach on schedule. With troops pouring over the sea wall from succeeding waves, what had begun as intermingling at the point of overlap in the center of the landing area had grown to temporary congestion and confusion. [146] Schneeloch ltr, 20 Mar 55. [147] Col G. R. Newton ltr to CMC, 8 Apr 55. [148] Capt P. F. Pedersen memo to CMC, 1 May 55. [Illustration: SEIZURE OF RED BEACH 5TH MARINES] _LSTs Under Enemy Fire_ Out in the channel, the first of eight LSTs[149] heralded the climax of the ship-to-shore movement at 1830 by crossing the line of departure and heading for the sea wall. Prior to the approach, ships’ officers had spotted the close fighting on the north flank of RED Beach as they peered through binoculars from their respective bridges. Later, noting the growing knot of Marines in the center of the waterfront area, they concluded that the assault troops could not advance inland. This impression was strengthened by an abrupt procession of gun flashes on Observatory Hill where, owing to the delay in the attack by Companies C and D, a handful of enemy soldiers had recovered from shock sufficiently to set up machine guns. A few North Korean mortar crews in the city also came to life and manned their weapons. [149] Under the over all command of LCdr James C. Wilson, who flew his broad pennant in LST 859, the eight ships were: 859 (Lt L. Tinsley); 883 (Lt C. M. Miller); 914 (Lt R. L. Holzhaus); 973 (Lt R. I. Trapp); 898 (Lt R. M. Beckley); 975 (Lt A. W. Harer); 857 (Lt D. Weidemeyer); and 799 (Lt T. E. Houston).