By 9 November, when the Division supply trains resumed their runs, 95 loaded cars had accumulated at Wonsan. The 1st Combat Service Group continued to route supplies northward from the railhead at the Wonsan airfield. Corps orders required troops to ride in open gondola cars.[316] [316] 1st CSG _SAR_, 8. _Appraisals of the New Enemy_ It is understandable that an atmosphere of uncertainty should have enveloped military decisions of this period. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the UN command groping their way through a fog of war, division commanders in Korea could not be expected to see very far ahead. Disconcerting as it had been to have the Chinese appear in the first place, it was even more disturbing to have them break off contact and vanish so inexplicably. Nevertheless, General MacArthur and his staff had a fairly accurate idea of CCF numbers at this time. On 2 November the UN command estimated that 16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers had crossed the Yalu and 450,000 CCF regulars were in Manchuria. Three days later, Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s intelligence summary warned that the Chinese had the potential to start a large-scale counteroffensive.[317] [317] GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_. General MacArthur, reporting to the United Nations for the first half of November, stated that 12 CCF divisions had been identified in Korea, indicating a total of perhaps 100,000 troops. Nine of these units had appeared on the Eighth Army front and three in the X Corps zone north of Hamhung. “At the same time,” the report continued, “United Nations aerial reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in Manchuria, and into Korea.”[318] [318] Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea, for the Period 1 to 15 November 1950 in Dept State, _United Nations Action in Korea_ (Washington, 1951), 9. Quite as important as the new enemy’s numbers was the question of his intentions. Did the CCF divisions consist merely of so-called volunteers making a demonstration to encourage the beaten _NKPA_ remnants? Or were the Chinese contemplating an all-out military intervention? President Truman asked JCS on 4 November to obtain from General MacArthur an estimate of the situation.[319] The general’s reply stated that it was “impossible to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.” He recommended “... that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of military facts.”[320] [319] C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman _Memoirs_ II, 373. [320] Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50.