[12] US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 361–362. The information was forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that he had never been informed of it. _Military Situation in the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area_ (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter _MacArthur Hearings_), 109. It will be recalled that the JCS authorization of 27 September permitted operations north of the Parallel “... provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, _no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea_....”[13] In view of the last two provisos, MacArthur’s plans for crossing the border could conceivably have been cancelled after Chou’s announcement. But optimism over the course of the war ran high among the United Nations at this time, and CinCUNC shortly received supplemental authority from both the UN and JCS--the one establishing legal grounds for an incursion into North Korea, the other reaffirming military concurrence at the summit. In a resolution adopted on 7 October, the United Nations directed that [13] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 360; Whitney, _MacArthur_, 397. Italics supplied. All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea and all constituent acts be taken ... for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the Sovereign State of Korea....[14] [14] Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in _Guide to the UN in Korea_, 20. Since the enemy had ignored his surrender ultimatum, MacArthur could attend to the UN objectives only by occupying North Korea militarily and imposing his will. JCS, therefore, on 9 October amplified its early instructions to the Commander in Chief as follows: Hereafter, in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military actions against objectives in Chinese territory.[15] [15] JCS msg 93709, 9 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 362; Whitney, _MacArthur_, 404. _MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity_