U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Provisions for the advance of RCT-5 east of the Chosin Reservoir were
included in Division OpnO 22-50, issued at 0800 on 17 November. As a
preliminary, RCT-7 was given a two-fold mission: (1) to protect the
Division left flank between Hagaru and Yudam-ni with a minimum of a
battalion; and (2) to relieve elements of RCT-5 and protect the MSR in
zone from positions in the vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.
RCT-5 was assigned these missions: (1) to pass a minimum of a battalion
through RCT-7 at Hagaru; (2) to move up the east side of the Chosin
Reservoir and seize Sinhung-ni, about 7 miles northeast of Hagaru; and
(3), on order, to seize the road junction at Kyolmul-ni, some 20 miles
north of Hagaru.
Division Reconnaissance Company was to screen the left flank of the MSR
in the vicinity of Majon-dong, and the 11th Marines to maintain its 4th
Battalion in that area prepared for employment in the north on order.
OpnO 22-50 directed the Supply Regulating Detachment (1) to establish
a truckhead at Hagaru after taking over and consolidating the dumps of
RCT-7; (2) to control traffic between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni; and (3)
to support RCTs 5 and 7, with priority to RCT-5. The following supply
levels were fixed:
Classes I and III, five days;
Class V, 1 Unit of fire;
Classes II and IV, as required for all troops operating to the
north and west of Koto-ri.[341]
[341] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 22-50_, 17 Nov 50.
Although the advance westward to Huksu-ri remained the mission of
RCT-1, the shortage of rail and motor transport slowed the movement
from Wonsan to Chigyong. The last elements had not arrived on the
18th when Corps asked and received the consent of Division to the
employment of the 26th ROK Regiment for the attack on Huksu-ri, with
the understanding that the objective would be turned over to RCT-1 at
a later date. On the morning of the 19th the ROK unit left Chigyong to
execute its mission.[342]
[342] 1stMar _SAR_, 12; G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1220
18 Nov 50; 26thROK msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50.
Two days later RCT-1 was relieved of this responsibility when Corps
verbally notified Division that Huksu-ri had been placed within the
modified boundary of the 3d Infantry Division. This was confirmed
the next day by X Corps OI 17, which also directed the Division to
establish blocking positions at Yudam-ni.[343]
[343] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; X Corps _OI 17_, 22 Nov 50. See
also G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in
G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 20 Nov 50.
Up to this time General Smith had not been able to make much progress
toward Yudam-ni without dispersing his units to an extent which he
regarded as imprudent. But with the availability of RCT-1 to occupy
positions on the MSR behind the other two infantry regiments, he could
now push ahead.
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