Marine motor columns were winding along the narrow, twisting mountain road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni in preparation for the attack in the morning. Upon arrival at Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s 1/7 CP, General Smith learned to his discomfort that the hovering ability of a rotary-wing aircraft is curtailed at high altitudes. The helicopter dropped like a stone the last ten feet, but fortunately no injury resulted to passenger, pilot or machine.[366] [366] Smith, _Chronicle_, 89. On the 26th intelligence arrived at Hamhung from the 7th Marines, reporting capture of three soldiers from the 60th CCF Division. They asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th CCF Army had reached the Yudam-ni area on the 20th. According to these enlisted men, Chinese strategy envisioned a move south and southeast from Yudam-ni to cut the MSR after two Marine regiments passed.[367] [367] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50. X Corps had received similar reports of Chinese movement southeast from Yudam-ni as well as air reports of enemy activity north and northeast of the Chosin Reservoir. Six Chinese divisions had now been identified in northeast Korea but both Corps and Division intelligence estimates of probable enemy action continued to be optimistic. Although Chinese attacks on the division’s MSR or along the Huichon-Huksu-ri-Hamhung axis were not ruled out, G-2 officers seemed to consider a continued westward withdrawal more likely.[368] [368] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 32; 1stMarDiv _PIR 33_. Division planning went ahead on the assumption of commander and staff that the enemy would be met in strength in the mountainous country west of Yudam-ni. This was the basis for the decision to pass the relatively fresh 5th Marines through the 7th for the attack westward.[369] [369] Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, _Chronicle_, 79, 82, 87. It was a cold, clear Sunday afternoon when General Smith returned to Hungnam. From his helicopter he could see for several miles on either side, and no signs of enemy activity were discerned in the snow-clad hills. After his arrival at the Division CP, however, the Marine general was informed that the situation had gone from bad to worse in west Korea. The II ROK Corps on the right flank had disintegrated on the 26th under a second day’s heavy blows, thus exposing the 2d Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade to flank attack. In short, the Eighth Army offensive had been brought to a standstill before the Marines could jump off in the morning as the other arm of the United Nations envelopment. CHAPTER VIII Crisis at Yudam-ni _Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before CCF Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese Seize Hill 1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of North Ridge_