U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
At the other end of the evacuation chain, clearing stations had been
established by X Corps at Yonpo Airfield to receive and distribute
casualties. A 30-day evacuation policy was maintained, and the
casualties to remain in the area went to the 1st Marine Division
Hospital in Hungnam, the Army 121st Evacuation Hospital in Hamhung, and
the USS _Consolation_ in Hungnam harbor. Casualties requiring more than
30 days of hospitalization were flown from Yonpo to Japan, though a
few critical cases were evacuated directly from Hagaru to Japan.[498]
[498] _Ibid._
It was planned for incoming transports at Hagaru to fly both supplies
and troop replacements. Meanwhile, on 1 December, the 1st Marine
Division had its first C-119 air drop from Japan. Known as “Baldwins,”
these drops consisted of a prearranged quantity of small arms
ammunition, weapons, water, rations, and medical supplies, though the
amounts could be modified as desired.[499]
[499] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n.
d.
Air drops, however, did not have the capability of supplying an RCT in
combat, let alone a division. At this time the Combat Cargo Command,
FEAF, estimated its delivery capabilities at only 70 tons per day;
and even though in practice this total was stepped up to 100, it fell
five short of the requirements of an RCT. Fortunately, the foresight
of the Division commander and staff had enabled the Supply Regulating
Detachment to build up a level of six days’ rations and two units of
fire at Hagaru.[500] This backlog, plus such quantities as could be
delivered by Baldwin drops, promised to see the Division through the
emergency.
[500] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004.
Infantrymen are seldom given to self-effacement, but at nightfall on 1
December only an ungrateful gravel-cruncher could have failed to pay a
silent tribute to the other services as well as to the supporting arms
of the Marine Corps. Navy medics, FEAF airmen, Army service units--they
had all helped to make it possible for the Marines to plan a breakout.
Yet it is likely that the 1st Engineer Battalion came first in the
affections of wounded men being loaded in the C-47s for evacuation.
In just twelve days and nights the engineers of Company D had hacked
this airstrip out of the frozen earth. Marine infantrymen could never
forget the two critical nights of battle when they looked back over
their shoulders from combat areas at the heartening spectacle of the
dozers puffing and huffing under the floodlights. In a pinch Lieutenant
Colonel Partridge’s specialists had doubled as riflemen, too, and
several platoons were riddled with casualties. Thanks in large part to
the engineers, the Hagaru base was no longer isolated on 1 December.
And though the enemy did not yet realize it, he had lost the initiative
on this eventful Friday. The Marines at Yudam-ni were coming out, and
they were coming out fighting with their casualties and equipment.
CHAPTER XII
Breakout From Yudam-ni
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