_Joint Planning for Breakout--The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542--March of 1/7 Over the Mountains--Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December--The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass--CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542--Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December--Entry into Hagaru Perimeter_ The first steps toward regaining the initiative were taken by the Marine command as early as 29 November. Upon being informed that the composite battalion had failed to open up the MSR south of Yudam-ni, General Smith concluded that it was a task for a regiment. At 1545 that afternoon he issued the following orders to RCTs 5 and 7: RCT-5 assume responsibility protection Yudam-ni area adjusting present dispositions accordingly. RCT-7 conduct operations clear MSR to Hagaru without delay employing entire regiment.[501] [501] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1750 29 Nov 50. That same evening the Division CP received X Corps OI 19, providing that an RCT be redeployed from the Yudam-ni area to Hagaru.[502] No further directives from Division were necessary to implement this instruction, since it had been anticipated in General Smith’s orders. [502] XCorps _OI 19_, 29 Nov 50. Upon receipt, the two Yudam-ni regimental commanders began joint planning for measures to be taken. The unusual command situation at Yudam-ni, in the absence of the assistant division commander, was explained by Colonel Litzenberg: The 5th and 7th Marines were each acting under separate orders from the Division. The Division would issue orders to one regiment with information to the other, so that Division retained the control; and, of course, the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, in general support of both regiments, was not actually under the control of either of us. Lieutenant Colonel Murray ... operated in very close coordination with me, sometimes at his own command post and sometimes at mine. We called in [Major] McReynolds, the commander of 4/11, discussed the situation with him, and thereafter Lieutenant Colonel Murray and I issued orders jointly as necessary.... This command arrangement functioned very well. There was never any particular disagreement.[503] [503] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 57. Maj McReynolds had already placed his battalion under Col Litzenberg as senior officer present. LtCol W. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56. For purposes of planning the supporting fires for the breakout, an artillery groupment was formed and Lieutenant Colonel Feehan given the responsibility of coordination. It was further agreed that no air drops of 155mm ammunition would be requested because of the greater number of 105mm rounds which could be received with fewer difficulties.[504] [504] LtCol H. A. Feehan Comments, 1 Aug 56. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.