U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Captain Gould and his demolitions crew of engineers had been waiting
for hours to blow the treadway bridge after the last elements of the
Division crossed. With the passage of the two tanks and Hargett’s
platoon, it was believed that all Marines who could be extricated were
safely over the span. On this assumption, which later proved to be
erroneous, CWO Willie Harrison set off the demolition charges.
The losses of the Recon platoon were three men MIA (two of them later
changed to KIA) and 12 wounded. Crews of the two rear tanks were
missing and presumed dead.[621] Hargett’s losses would have been more
severe except for the fact that some of his men were wearing Marine
body armor made of light-weight plastics.
[621] CO 1stTkBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 11 Dec 50, gives
tank personnel losses as 4 MIA.
To another man of Hargett’s platoon went the distinction of being the
last Marine out at the finish of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. When
durable PFC DeMott recovered consciousness, after being blown over the
brink by the CCF pack charge explosion, he found himself precariously
perched on a ledge overhanging the chasm. Slightly wounded, he
managed to climb back on the road, where he encountered only Korean
refugees. Upon hearing a tremendous detonation he realized that the
bridge had been blown. He remembered, however, that pedestrians could
cross through the gatehouse above the penstocks, and he came down the
mountain with the refugees to Chinhung-ni. There he was given a welcome
befitting one who has cheated death of a sure thing.
The remaining tanks made it safely to Chinhung-ni without benefit of
infantry protection other than what was afforded by Recon Company.[622]
Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck did not receive a copy of 1stMar OpnO 16-50,
he explained, his only information being a Frag O designating 1/1 as
rear guard and “a hasty, 30-second conference” with Colonel Puller
when the 1st Marine command group passed through. “I was informed,” he
added, “that the tanks were in the rear of the 1st Marines, that 2d Bn,
31st Infantry was bringing up the rear, and that as soon as that unit
passed, I would employ my battalion as rear guard.... No mention at all
was made of the Reconnaissance Company. In order to check off the units
that passed endlessly through my lines, I established a check point at
the incline railway overpass and kept a close record of movement.”
[622] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 36; Snedeker narrative, Apr 51; Statement
of N. A. Canzona, n. d.; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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