U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The flying boats, Mariners and Sunderlands, were called upon to assist
by conducting systematic aerial searches for moored and drifting
mines, which they destroyed by .50 caliber machine-gun fire. Soon an
effective new technique was developed as the seaplanes carried overlays
of Hydrographic Office charts to be marked with the locations of all
mines sighted. These charts were dropped to the sweepers and were of
considerable assistance in pinpointing literally hundreds of mines.[77]
[77] ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt
_Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, D8.
On the 18th one of the Japanese sweepers, the _JMS-14_, hit a mine
and went down. In spite of this loss, the end seemed in sight. No
attempt was being made to clear all the mines; but with a lane swept
into the harbor, it remained only to check the immediate area of the
landing beaches. So hopeful did the outlook appear that it was more
disillusioning when the ROK _YMS 516_ disintegrated on 19 October
after a terrific explosion in the supposedly cleared lane. Thus was TG
95.6 rudely introduced to the fact that the sweepers had to deal with
magnetic mines in addition to the other types. The mechanism could
be set to allow as many as 12 ships to pass over the mine before it
exploded. This meant, of course, that the sweepers must make at least
13 passes over any given area before it could be considered safe.[78]
[78] Smith, _Notes_, 404–407; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326.
The _Mount McKinley_ having arrived off Wonsan that same day, Admiral
Doyle and General Almond, with six members of the X Corps staff, went
by boat to the battleship _Missouri_ for a conference with Admiral
Struble. CJTF-7 asserted that he would not authorize the administrative
landing until the magnetic mines were cleared from the shipping lane--a
task which he estimated would take three more days. This announcement
led to General Almond’s decision to fly ashore in the _Missouri’s_
helicopter on the 20th and establish his CP in Wonsan.[79] So rapidly
had the situation changed, it was hard to remember that this date had
once been set as D-Day when the Marine landing force would fight for a
beachhead.
[79] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith,
_Notes_, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,”
11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of the Korean
Conflict,” _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, lxxx,
no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326;
1stMarDiv G-1 Journal 20 Oct 50.
_Operation Yo-Yo_
Shortly after 1700 on the afternoon of 19 October, a rumor swept
through the 250 ships of the Tractor and Transport Groups. “War’s
over!” shouted the excited Marines. “They’re taking us back to Pusan
for embarkation to the States.”
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