On the 16th, VMFs-214 and -323 departed Sasebo for station off Wonsan in the CVE’s _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_. From the following day until the 27th these two fighter squadrons were to provide air cover for the mine sweeping operations off Wonsan and the ensuing 1st Marine Division administrative landing.[87] [87] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF-214 _SAR_), 2. TAC X Corps OpnO 2-50, issued on 15 October, had contemplated the opening of the port at Wonsan and arrival of the surface echelon within three days. Until then the two squadrons at Wonsan airfield were to be dependent on airlift for all supplies. The unforeseen ten-day delay in clearing a lane through the mine field made it difficult to maintain flight operations. Fuel was pumped by hand from 55-gallon drums which had been rolled along the ground about a mile from the dump to the flight line. Muscle also had to substitute for machinery in ordnance sections which had only one jeep and eight bomb trailers for moving ammunition.[88] [88] Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” 20; 1stMAW _HD_, _Oct 50_; TAC X Corps _OpnO 2-50_, 15 Oct 50, in _Ibid._ Despite such difficulties, air operations from the new field were speeded up when General Almond landed to establish the X Corps CP at Wonsan on the 20th, after taking control of I ROK Corps. Armed reconnaissance sorties were flown regularly and attacks made on retreating bodies of NKPA troops. On the 24th a VMF-312 flight surprised a column of about 800 Korean Reds near Kojo, 39 miles southeast of Wonsan, and scattered it with heavy losses. There were administrative as well as operational problems to be solved. If an assault landing had been carried out at Wonsan, the provision for air support would have been planned in a manner similar to that of Inchon. But the change to an administrative landing caused the 1st MAW to be placed under the control of the Far East Air Forces. This was in accordance with a CinCFE directive to the effect that when both FEAF and Naval air were assigned missions in Korea, coordination control would be exercised by CG FEAF. He had in turn delegated that control north of the 38th parallel, including close-support operations of carrier-borne planes, to CG Fifth Air Force. An effort was made at first by MAG-12 officers to comply with Fifth AF procedures, which required the schedule for any given day’s strikes to be submitted to that headquarters by 1800 the previous day. Obviously, the distance separating X Corps in Wonsan from Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Seoul made it virtually impossible to get clearance in time. This issue was speedily settled by a conference in which Major General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, CG Fifth Air Force, gave General Harris oral permission to plan and execute supporting missions for X Corps in northeast Korea while awaiting clearance from the Fifth AF.