2 Area of Operations, 1st Marine Division, October-December 1950 12, 122 3 Wonsan and Harbor 16 4 Kojo Area 47 5 Majon-ni and Road to Wonsan 62 6 Majon-ni Perimeter 64 7 The Main Supply Route of the 1st Marine Division 97 8 Battle of Sudong, 1st Phase 101 9 Chinhung-ni Tank Fight, 4 November 111 10 Action of 4–5 November and Funchilin Pass 115 11 1st Marine Division Zone and Objectives 130 12 Yudam-ni 153 13 Marine Attacks, 27 November 155 14 Battle of Northwest Ridge 162 15 Action at 3/5’s CP 169 16 The Battle of North Ridge 173 17 Hagaru Defensive Perimeter 199 18 East Hill Attacks, 29 November 212 19 Koto-ri Perimeter, 28 November-7 December 223 20 Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November-1 December 227 21 Task Force Drysdale Ambush, 28 November 230 22 East Hill Attacks, 30 November 237 23 Breaking off Action, 30 November 252 24 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 1 December 256 25 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 2–4 December 269 26 Seizure of East Hill and Chinese Counterattack 6–7 December 289 27 Last Night at Hagaru, 6–7 December 292 28 Breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December 295 29 Funchilin Pass and Advances of 8–10 December 310 30 Hungnam Docks and Beaches 344 CHAPTER I Problems Of Victory _Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender Message to_ NKPA _Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity--Logistical Problems of Advance--Naval Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing_ It is a lesson of history that questions of how to use a victory can be as difficult as problems of how to win one. This truism was brought home forcibly to the attention of the United Nations (UN) heads, both political and military, during the last week of September 1950. Already, with the fighting still in progress, it had become evident that the UN armies were crushing the forces of Communism in Korea, as represented by the remnants of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA).