On 1 November the 7th Marines trucked out of Hamhung to an assembly area midway between Oro-ri and Majon-dong. Moving into position behind the 26th ROK Regiment without incident, Colonel Litzenberg ordered a reconnaissance which took Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st Battalion about four miles northward to the South Korean positions above Majon-dong. Late that afternoon the regiment secured for the night in a tight perimeter.[241] [241] 7thMar _SAR_, 5, 7. Attached to the regiment were the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (Major Francis F. Parry); Division Reconnaissance Company (First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman); Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion (Captain Byron C. Turner); 1st Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Olin L. Beall); Company E, 1st Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Charles K. Holloway); and detachments from the 1st Signal Battalion, 1st Service Battalion, and Division Military Police Company.[242] [242] _Ibid._, 3. Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d. Intelligence based on the questioning of the 16 prisoners taken by the ROKs had revealed that they had been attacked by elements of the 370th Regiment of the 124th CCF Division. Along with the 125th and 126th, the other two divisions of the 42d CCF Army, the 124th had crossed the Yalu during the period 14–20 October. After marching southeast via Kanggye and Changjin, the unit deployed for the defense of the Chosin Reservoir power complex while the 126th pushed eastward to the Fusen Reservoir and the 125th protected the right flank of the 42d CCF Army.[243] [243] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6. Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55. X Corps G-2 officers concluded that these CCF forces were “probably flank security” for the enemy’s 4th Army Group across the peninsula in the EUSAK zone.[244] The G-2 section of the 1st Marine Division arrived at this interpretation: [244] X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov 50_, 24. The capture by the 26th ROK Regt. of 16 POWs identified as being members of the 124th CCF Division ... would seem to indicate that the CCF has decided to intervene in the Korean War. It would indicate, also, that this reinforcement is being effected by unit rather than by piecemeal replacement from volunteer cadres. However, until more definite information is obtained it must be presumed that the CCF has not yet decided on full scale intervention.[245] [245] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6. Division intelligence officers concluded their analysis with the comment, “The advantage to be gained by all-out intervention, at a time when the NK forces are on the verge of complete collapse, is not readily apparent.”[246] [246] _Ibid._