U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Losses for the 1st Marine Division in May added up to 75 KIA, 8 DOW,
and 731 WIA. The ratio of wounded to killed, it may be noted, is more
than nine-to-one. This proportion, so much more favorable than the
usual ratio, rose to an even more astonishing 15-to-1 in June. Various
explanations have been offered, one of them being the spirit of cool
professionalism of Marines who had learned how to take cover and not
expose themselves to needless risks. But this doesn’t account for the
unusual ratio, and it may perhaps be concluded that the Marines were
simply lucky in this operation.
The comparatively low death rate has also been credited in part to the
alertness with which Marine officers adapted to changing situations.
War is a grim business on the whole, but Colonel Wilburt S. Brown
took an amusing advantage of enemy propaganda accusing Americans
of all manner of crimes against humanity. At the outset he had
requested colored smoke shells for signaling. But upon learning from
POW interrogations that NKPA soldiers were terrified by what they
believed to be frightful new gases, the commanding officer of the 1st
Marines had an added reason for using green, red, and yellow smoke.
Unfortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Adelman, commanding officer
of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, soon had to inform him that the
inadequate supply was exhausted.[213] It was never renewed during
Brown’s command.
[213] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 21 Aug 58.
Major David W. McFarland, commanding officer of VMO-6, also exploited
enemy ignorance. His original purpose in initiating night aerial
observation by OY planes was to improve artillery accuracy. Soon he
noticed that the mere presence of an OY overhead would silence enemy
artillery.
“The aerial observer,” McFarland explained, “was often unable to
determine the location of enemy artillery even though he could see it
firing, because he would be unable to locate map coordinates in the
dark--that is, relating them to the ground. Fortunately, this fact was
unknown to the enemy. From their observation of the OYs in the daytime,
they had found that the safest thing to do whenever an OY was overhead
was to take cover. This they continued to do at night.”[214]
[214] LtCol D. W. McFarland, ltr of 21 Aug 58.
VMO-6 also put into effect an improvement of 1st Marine Division aerial
photographic service at a time when the 1st MAW photo section had
missions all over the Korean front. Lieutenant Colonel Donald S. Bush,
commanding officer of the section, is credited with the innovation of
mounting a K-17 camera on a OY. Only a 6-inch focal length lens could
be installed on one of these small planes. This meant that in order to
get the same picture as a jet the OY must fly at half the altitude. The
pilot would be in more danger but haze problems were reduced.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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