U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The statistics of the 1st MAW indicate that out of a total of 1,875
combat sorties flown from 1 to 15 June 1951, about a third were close
air support--651 day CAS and 19 night CAS. Of this number, 377 sorties
went to the 1st Marine Division, which received more than half. Next
in line were the 7th Infantry Division (41 sorties), the 3d Infantry
Division (31 sorties), and the 25th Infantry Division (28 sorties).[229]
[229] 1st MAW _HD_, Jun 51. Pt 1, Chronology, 15 Jun.
The effect of Operation STRANGLE on the enemy must be left largely
to conjecture. There can be no doubt that it added enormously to the
Communists’ logistical problem. It is equally certain that they solved
these problems to such an extent that their combat units were never
at a decisive handicap for lack of ammunition and other supplies.
Operation STRANGLE, in short, merely added to the evidence that
interdictory air alone was not enough to knock a determined adversary
out of the war, as enthusiasts had predicted at the outbreak of
hostilities in Korea.
_KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack_
On the night of 1–2 June, Colonel Nickerson was notified that the 7th
Marines would be relieved next day by the 1st Marines, which would
pass through and continue the attack. The 1st Marines moved into
assembly areas at 0630. Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Hire, commanding
officer of 3/1, went forward at 0800 with his command group to make
a reconnaissance of the area. As his staff paused for a conference
in a supposedly enfiladed location, a Communist mortar barrage hit
the group by complete surprise. The artillery Liaison officer was
killed instantly. His assistant, two forward observers, four company
commanders, the S-3 and 32 enlisted men were wounded. So hard hit was
the battalion that its attack had to be postponed until the following
day.[230]
[230] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1915 2 Jun 51.
The first Division objective was designated X-RAY. 2/1 had the mission
of taking the high point, Hill 516 (Map 15). Across the valley 3/1
advanced up a parallel ridge. Planes from VMF-214 and VMF-323 cleared
the way for the securing of this battalion’s objective at 1900.
Aircraft from these same squadrons also aided 2/1 in over-running the
last opposition on Hill 516, where 80 NKPA dead were counted.[231]
[231] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 3 Jun 51; _HD_s of
VMF-214 and VMF-323, Jun 51.
[Illustration: MAP 16
1st MARINE AIR WING
OPERATING AREA
23 MAY-15 JULY 1951
UNIT LOCATIONS ON 1 JULY]
The KMC regiment, in reserve only two days, was ordered to relieve
the 5th Marines on 4 June. This would permit Colonel Hayward to shift
over to the right flank, thus extending the 1st Marine Division zone
5,000 yards to the east with a north-south boundary of the Soyang river
valley (Map 15). The purpose of this maneuver was to free 2d Infantry
Division troops for a mission of mopping up in the X Corps rear area.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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