U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
_1st Marines_--to be released from X Corps reserve near Hongchon
to Division control; to be prepared to pass through the 7th
Marines, when that regiment secured its objectives, and
continue the attack to seize Objective CHARLIE, the ridgeline
leading northwest from Hill 1052.
_5th Marines_--to maintain one company on KANSAS line while
occupying positions in Division reserve along HAYS Line in rear
of 7th Marines.
_KMC Regiment_--to patrol aggressively on Division left to exert
pressure on enemy defenses south and southeast of Objective
CHARLIE.
_11th Marines_--to displace forward to support attack of the 7th
Marines.
_Division Reconnaissance Company_--to patrol northward in the
Soyang valley as far as Hwanggi to deny the enemy this area.
The area ahead of the 7th Marines was ideal for defense. From YOKE
Ridge the assault troops had to descend into a narrow valley formed
by a small tributary of the Soyang-gang, cross the stream, and climb
Kanmubong Ridge on the other side. This formidable piece of terrain
was dominated by three enemy positions, Hills 812, 980, and 1052 (Map
17). Thus the attack of the 7th Marines had as its primary purpose
the securing of initial objectives on Kanmubong Ridge that would give
access to the main NKPA defense line, some 4,000 yards to the north.
The 7th Marines was to seize the eastern tip (Objective ABLE) of this
commanding terrain feature and “run the ridge” to Hill 749, Objective
BAKER. While Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Griffin’s 2/7 maintained its
patrolling activities on the left, tied in with the KMCs, Lieutenant
Colonel B. T. Kelly’s 3/7 in the center and Lieutenant Colonel J. G.
Kelly’s 1/7 on the right were to attack.
As an intermediate regimental objective on the way to Kanmubong Ridge,
the 680-meter hill directly north of B. T. Kelly’s position on Hill 602
was assigned to his battalion. He ordered How Company to move forward
under cover of darkness and be prepared to attack at dawn. Rain and
poor visibility delayed the attempt until surprise was lost, and after
a fierce fire fight How Company was stopped halfway up the southeast
spur.
In order to relieve the pressure, the battalion commander directed Item
Company to attack on the left up the southwest spur. This maneuver
enabled How Company to inch forward under heavy mortar and machine gun
fire to a point with 50 yards of the topographical crest. Item Company
became confused in the “fog of war” and finally wound up on How’s spur
at 1245.
Twice the two companies made a combined assault after artillery and
mortar preparation and air strikes with napalm, rocket, and strafing
fire. Both times the North Koreans swarmed out of their bunkers to
drive the Marines halfway back to the original jump off line. It was
anybody’s fight when the two battered companies dug in at dusk.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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