Across the valley to the east, J. G. Kelly’s 1/7 had no better fortune in its attack on Hill 673. Heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire kept the assault troops pinned down until they consolidated for the night. With both attacking battalions in trouble, Colonel Nickerson ordered 2/7 to advance up the narrow valley separating them. His plan called for the reserve battalion to move under cover of darkness around the left flank of 1/7 and into a position behind the enemy before wheeling to the northeast to trap the North Koreans defending Hill 673. The maneuver succeeded brilliantly. Griffin’s troops were undetected as they filed northward during the night, making every effort to maintain silence. By daybreak on 12 September 2/7 had two platoons in position behind the enemy to lead the attack.[276] [276] LtCol E. G. Kurdziel interv, 13 Jun 58. The assault exploded with complete surprise as 2/7 swept to the crest of Hill 673 against confused and ineffectual opposition. Griffin’s battalion and 1/7 had the enemy between them, but the jaws of the trap could not close in time because of NKPA mine fields. Thus 1/7 continued to be held up on the forward approaches to Hill 673 by NKPA mortar and small-arms fire. Grenades were the most effective weapons as J. G. Kelly’s men slugged their way to the summit at 1415 while 2/7 was attacking Objective BAKER, Hill 749. On the other side of the valley, 3/7 had seized its initial objective. While How and Item Companies attacked up the southeast spur, where they had been stopped the day before, George Company launched a surprise assault up the southwest spur. This was the blow that broke the enemy’s will to resist. George Company knocked out seven active enemy bunkers, one by one, thus taking the pressure off the troops on the other spur. At 1028 all three companies met on the summit. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, radioed that Objective BAKER had been secured at 1710 after a hard fight, but this report proved to be premature. Enough NKPA troops to give the Marines a good deal of trouble were still holding the wooded slopes of Hill 749, and it would take the attack of a fresh battalion to dislodge them. Along the ridgeline from Hill 673 to Hill 749, an undetermined number of enemy soldiers had been caught between 2/7 and 1/7, and events were to prove that they would resist as long as a man remained alive. Casualties of the 1st Marine Division on 11 and 12 September were 22 KIA and 245 WIA, nearly all of them being suffered by the assault regiment. Enemy losses included 30 counted KIA and 22 prisoners. _The Mounting Problem of CAS_