_U.S. 1st Marine Division_ holding eastern portion of the Corps sector; ROK I CORPS _ROK 11th Division_ responsible for left of the Corps front; _ROK Capitol Division_ holding the line eastward to the Sea of Japan; _ROK 3d Division_ in reserve at Yangyang for a period of training.[296] [296] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Oct 31, 5–6 and Plate 1; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3. Some rather complicated juggling of units took place on the X Corps front, giving the effect of a game of musical chairs in the tactical sphere. From 18 to 21 September the 1st Marine Division extended its line eastward to relieve the 8th ROK Division on the extreme right of the Corps area. That Division in turn relieved the 5th ROK Division on the extreme left, whereupon the latter leapfrogged the 2d Infantry Division to occupy a new sector on the left of the Marines. _Statement by General Van Fleet_ “Theirs not to reason why” could never have been written about American fighting men. From 1775 to the present day, they have always taken a keen interest in the high-level strategic and tactical decisions governing their operations. This applies with particular force to the Marines, who have seldom had a voice in the shaping of operations above the division level. As if in direct reply to unspoken questions, the commanding general of the Eighth Army made a statement on 30 September explaining the purpose of his strategy. “My basic mission during the past four months,” he said, “has been to destroy the enemy, so that the men of Eighth Army will not be destroyed.... Each loaded enemy weapon was a definite threat to the Eighth Army. It was imperative that we knock out as many of those weapons as we could find....” “In prodding the enemy in the deep belly of the peninsula,” continued General Van Fleet, “we have taken many casualties.... It was mandatory that we control the high ground features, so that we could look down the throat of the enemy and thereby better perform our task of destruction.... In seizing these hills we lost men, but in losing a comparative few we saved other thousands.” Estimated casualties, inflicted on the enemy by UN ground forces alone from 25 May to 25 September, were announced as 188,237 by the EUSAK commander. “As we open our autumn campaign,” he added, “the enemy potential along the front line has been sharply reduced by our hill-hopping tactics. The Communist forces in Korea are not liquidated but they are badly crippled.”[297] [297] _Ibid._, 29–30. Even so, EUSAK G-2 summaries credited the enemy on 1 October 1951 with more than 600,000 troops at the front, or in reserve and available as immediate reinforcements. Six CCF armies and one NKPA corps were capable of reinforcing the units on the MLR or participating in an offensive. The enemy also had an estimated 7,000 men in guerrilla forces behind the UN lines.[298] [298] _Ibid._, 7–9 and Plate No. 4.