All three Marine regiments on Line MINNESOTA were directed by General Thomas to fight the enemy whenever possible with his own weapons in the form of ruses and night ambushes. On 31 October the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines feigned preparations for an attack even to the extent of a brief artillery barrage. When the firing let up, the Marines sounded an NKPA bugle call as a signal for enemy troops to rush out of bunkers and man open trenches. Thus exposed, they became the victims of intense Marine mortar and artillery fire which inflicted an estimated 47 KIA and 48 WIA casualties. During the last 2 weeks of October, 11 missions were fired by the battleship USS _New Jersey_ and 41 missions by the heavy cruiser USS _Toledo_. Appreciation was expressed in a message to the _Toledo_ by General Thomas: “Your accurate and effective fire during period 24–29 October made an important contribution to operations of this division. Many thanks and come again.”[319] [319] CO 1stMarDiv msg to USS _Toledo_, 1232 30 Oct 51 in G-3 msgs, Oct 51. Antiguerrilla raids behind the MLR were carried out by Marine ground forces relying upon HMR-161 helicopters for transportation. In Operation BUSHBEATER teams from 1/1 were landed on the Division’s east flank to sweep westward toward the Soyang-gang on 22 October while teams from Recon Company patrolled from the opposite direction. Operations HOUSEBURNER I and II were planned to deprive guerrillas of shelter during the coming winter. As the name implies, helicopter-borne teams set Korean huts afire with flame throwers and incendiary grenades.[320] [320] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 172–173. Enemy forces facing the Marines at various times in October were believed to comprise the 2d Division, II NKPA Corps, the 1st and 15th Divisions of III Corps, and the 19th Division of VI Corps. NKPA casualties during the month were announced by the 1st Marine Division as 709 counted and 2,377 estimated KIA, 4,927 estimated WIA, and 571 prisoners. The Marines (including the 1st KMC Regiment) suffered losses of 50 KIA, 2 MIA, and 323 WIA.[321] [321] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 2. _Marine Operations of November 1951_ On 1 November 1951 the front line strength of the opposing forces was nearly equal--195,000 for the UN, and 208,000 for the enemy. In reserves the Communists held their usual numerical advantage with nine CCF armies totaling 235,000 men plus 138,600 in four NKPA corps. All were readily available either as reinforcements or as assault troops for a great offensive.[322] [322] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 9.