Marine operations in December were shaped in advance by the resumption of armistice negotiations. This time Panmunjom was agreed upon as a conference site instead of Kaesong. Literally a wide place in the road, the tiny hamlet was located just north of the 38th Parallel between Munsan and Kaesong (Map 19). In the lack of houses, tents provided shelter for the UN and Communist delegates who renewed their meetings on 25 October 1951 for the first time since the Reds walked out at Kaesong on 23 August. Discussions during November were largely devoted to the question of a cease fire based upon a line of demarcation. On the 23d it was agreed to accept a line linking up the farthest points of repeated contacts up to 2,000 yards forward of the United Nations MLR. Three days later, representatives of both sides initialed maps to indicate acceptances.[328] [328] References to the Panmunjom decisions are based upon the following sources: William H. Vatcher, Jr., _Panmunjom, The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations_ (New York: F. Praeger, 1958), 72–94, 232–237; _Joy, How Communists Negotiate_, 40–52. The effect of the so-called cease fire on EUSAK operations was immediate. General Van Fleet sent his corps commanders a letter of instructions warning that active defensive operations were to continue until a full armistice had been concluded. If such an event took place within 30 days after 27 November 1951, the demarcation line would not be altered. But if an agreement had not been reached by that time, the line would be revised in accordance with actual changes.[329] [329] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 58. EUSAK instructions to corps commanders were relayed in a X Corps message of 27 November to the 1st Marine Division: _Part 1._ The conference at Panmunjom has fixed a military demarcation line as a preliminary step to ending hostilities within a 30-day period. _Part II._ Every US, UN, and ROK soldier will be informed that hostilities will continue until armistice agreement is signed.