This was made possible by the powerful lights of a platoon from the 92d U.S. Army Searchlight Company, attached to the 11th Marines. The mountainous terrain in East Korea was not particularly suited to “artificial moonlight”--the indirect illumination of a large area which results from “bouncing” the rays of searchlights off low-lying clouds. But direct illumination permitted aimed 90mm fire in the darkness and had the further advantage of blinding the enemy to the tanks themselves as well as to troop movements behind them. Not a single light was shot out during the winter in spite of persistent NKPA attempts. The lessons taught by battlefield illumination in Korea were to be incorporated into two instructive bulletins after the war. “The enemy does _not_ have any better night vision than we do,” asserted USMC Landing Force Bulletin No. 6. “No racial or national group of people has any inherent physical advantage over another as to capability for seeing in darkness....[357] The apparent advantage which the enemy sometimes displays in night operations is due only to a difference in training. In the case of the Oriental soldier, or the Eskimo, for example, training usually begins early in life, where he does not have the convenience of artificial light to the degree we have, and has been forced to make maximum use of his natural night vision in many of his normal activities. “U.S. Forces have conducted many successful night operations after adequate training. Some units have reported that after intensive night training, personnel have become so proficient that they sometimes prefer night operations to daylight operations.” [357] U.S. Marine Corps Landing Force Bulletin No. 6, “Night Vision and Night Combat,” 5 Dec 53. See also Bulletin No. 18, “Battlefield Illumination,” 4 Jun 56. In support of this conclusion, records for the winter of 1951–1952 reveal that the Marines held their own very well in the night combats of no man’s land, where the outcome depended upon immediate decisions based upon seeing in the dark. Marine casualties for February, the last full month in East Korea, were 23 KIA, 102 WIA, and 1 MIA, including the KMC Regiment. Enemy losses were reported as 174 counted and 381 estimated KIA, 606 estimated WIA, and 63 prisoners.[358] [358] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, App No. 5. Other sources for this chapter are comments and criticism by the following officers: (Ranks listed are those held at time of interview or comment.) Gen G. C. Thomas; LtGen J. T. Selden; BrigGen S. S. Wade; BrigGen C. R. Allen; Col J. H. Tinsley; Col F. B. Nihart; Col J. F. Stamm; Col B. T. Hemphill.