[354] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 52, 3. On the other hand, five deserters from the mortar company of the 1st Battalion, 91st Regiment, 45th NKPA Division revealed that advantage had been taken of Operation CLAM-UP by detailing mortar personnel and men from the rifle companies to carry ammunition. During the five-day lull, according to the prisoners, 2,600 rounds were brought up for the company’s nine mortars.[355] [355] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ No. 486, Feb 52. After the brief flurry of Operation CLAM-UP the front quickly settled down to its old routine of patrols. An average of eight Marine night ambush patrols and five daylight reconnaissance patrols forward of the MLR was maintained. The results left much to be desired. Of the last 110 ambuscades and 75 reconnaissance patrols reported in February, only 1 of the former and 6 of the latter claimed contacts. All but one of the contacts had negligible results. The Marine fire attack did the enemy more damage. Artillery fired 679 observed missions during the month--211 on troops, 175 on bunkers, 121 on mortars, 96 on artillery, and 75 on such miscellaneous targets as OPs, vehicles, machine guns, and supply points. This total was recorded in spite of an ammunition shortage which would ultimately become the subject of debate in Congress. Even with supplies of ammunition limited by X Corps orders, Marine artillery drove the enemy from untenable forward-slope positions to underground fortifications on the reverse slope. Naval gunfire was limited by the extreme range to the Division zone of action.[356] Only large targets forward and to the right of center could be taken under fire. Even so, the _Wisconsin_ and the _St. Paul_ scored some devastating hits in February on enemy reverse slope positions. [356] The battleship _Wisconsin_ had a main battery of 16-inch guns with a maximum range of about 23 miles. The heavy cruiser _St. Paul_ had a main battery of 8-inch guns with a maximum range of 16 miles. On one occasion, the _Wisconsin_ erroneously calculated its deflection. Two 16-inch rounds landed between the front line and the 3/7 mortar positions before the fire could be stopped. Fortunately, no one was injured. The _Wisconsin_ Marine officer happened to be visiting the Division CP that day, and on hearing the news he came up to 3/7 and collected a large shell fragment. He stated that he intended to mount the jagged piece of steel in the ship’s CIC room as a reminder to future gunners to make no errors in plot. Observed direct fire by the 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank Battalion (Major Walter E. Reynolds, Jr.) continued to be effective against NKPA bunkers and gun emplacements. Utilizing the high ground along the MLR, particularly on Hills 812 and 854, tanks sniped at the enemy both by day and night.