U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
ROK III Corps--ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, from left to right on
central front. In Corps reserve, ROK 7th Division.
ROK II Corps--ROK 3d Division, on east-central front.
ROK I Corps--ROK 9th and Capital Divisions, from left to right on
eastern front.
The U.S. X Corps, comprising the newly reorganized U.S. 2d Infantry
Division at Wonju and the 7th Infantry Division in the Chungju area,
had been given a mission of bolstering the ROK-held line in central and
east Korea and blocking enemy penetrations to the rear.
In Eighth Army reserve was the 187th Airborne RCT, with Thailand
Battalion attached, in the Suwon area. Also under EUSAK operational
control in rear areas were the 1st Marine Division (Masan), the 3d
Infantry Division (Kyongju), the Canadian Battalion (Miryang), and the
New Zealand Field Artillery Battalion (Pusan).
[Illustration: EUSAK FRONT LINES 3 Jan. 51
MAP 4]
Altogether, the United Nations forces in Korea numbered 444,336 men
as of January 1951. The cosmopolitan character of the fight against
Communism is indicated by the aid given to the U.S. and ROK forces
by contingents of combat troops from 13 other nations--Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.[27]
[27] Sources for this section are EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51,
4–5, 7, 9, 27, 62–65.
Enemy numbers at this time were estimated at a total of 740,000 men in
Korea and nearby Manchuria. Seven CCF armies, the 37th, 38th, 39th,
40th, 42d, 50th, and 66th were identified among the troops attacking
on New Year’s Eve. The NKPA I and V Corps also participated. Estimated
strength of the assaulting forces was 174,000 Chinese and 60,000 North
Koreans.
Previously identified but not reported in contact with U.S. forces on
31 December were the 24th, 48th, 49th, and 65th CCF armies and the NKPA
1st, 3d, and 15th Divisions.
As another possibility which could not be overlooked, the five CCF
armies which had opposed X Corps in northeast Korea might also take
part in the new offensive. Elements of the 20th, 26th, 27th, 30th, and
32d Armies identified in that area early in December, had more than
two weeks in which to reorganize and make their way to the Eighth Army
front. If they got into the fight, it would mean a formidable addition
to the enemy’s forces.
With only five days at his disposal, after arrival in Korea, General
Ridgway’s preparations were limited. His dispositions could not be
blamed, but it was the old story of the chain and its weakest link
as the enemy scored a major breakthrough at the expense of the 1st
ROK Division on the west-central front. Unfortunately, this unit
represented the tactical joint between I Corps and IX Corps. The enemy
widened the gap before dawn and drove on toward Seoul.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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