U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
FEAF had standby plans to evacuate Korea entirely in an emergency. Some
of the secondary airfields of the Itazuke complex in Japan had been
reevaluated for this purpose. Originally built by the Japanese for
World War II, they were obsolescent by 1951 and because of weather,
neglect, and misuse badly deteriorated.[42]
[42] This section is based on the 1st MAW and MAG-33 _HD_s
of Jan 51; Fifth Air Force History (hereafter to be
designated FAF), Dec 50 and Jan 51; AHS-72, 35–37; EUSAK
_Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, Sec II, 12, 63, 64–65; _PacFlt Interim
Rpt_ No. 2, II, 969, 1062; Mobile Construction Battalion
Two (hereafter MCB-2) Report of Activities for Jan 51;
Col T. J. Noon, interv of 5 Jun 58.
The most promising of these secondary airfields were Tsuika, Ozuki, and
Bofu (Map 3), ranging from 30 to 65 miles east of Itazuke and facing
one another around Japan’s Inland Sea. Nearest to Itazuke and on the
same island of Kyushu was Tsuika. Across the narrow Shimonoseki Strait,
on the shore line of Honshu, were Ozuki and Bofu.
General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, informed General MacArthur
that it was necessary to start air operations from Ozuki and Bofu as
soon as possible. A good deal of work had already been done on Tsuika,
even to moving a major Japanese highway in order to lengthen the runway
to 7,000 feet. The Air Force general wanted to repair Ozuki for his
F-51 squadrons, and Bofu was to be reserved for the 1st MAW.
This decision meant a revision of plans for the Marines. MAG-12 had
recently been lifting a hundred men a day to K-1 (Pusan west) with a
view to making it into a major base. These preparations came to an
abrupt halt, pending the final decision on Bofu.
A Marine survey of that World War II airfield showed it to be in
serious disrepair. The Air Force had already rejected it as a base for
night-harassing B-26s. Although the runway was only 7 feet above sea
level, a 720-foot hill complicated the traffic pattern. Nevertheless,
Bofu was considered suitable for the time being, and the Air Force
assured the 1st MAW that its use would be but temporary.
FEAF proposed that the Marines start flying out of Bofu immediately,
operating under field conditions. There were, however, essential
repairs to be made. The 5,300-foot runway remained in fair condition,
but much of the taxiway was not surfaced and couldn’t stand heavy use
by the Corsairs, Three of the four hangars needed extensive repairs,
as did the barracks and mess hall. Fuel would have to be stored in
drums.
The Wing had the capability for minor construction but lacked the
equipment, men, and fiscal authority to handle major work on the
runways and taxiways. The Air Force offered to furnish the labor
and materials, provided that the Navy pay for them. The Navy in its
turn was too limited in funds to restore an Air Force field for only
temporary use by Marines.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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