U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
All Marine missions in the guerrilla hunt had been successfully
accomplished, so that the Division could be relieved at any time by the
2d ROK Division. There were 120 counted enemy dead and 184 prisoners.
Only estimates are available for the wounded, but there is no doubt
that the total NKPA casualties were crippling. At any rate, the NKPA
10th Division was destroyed as a fighting force without accomplishing
any of its objectives. Marine casualties from 18 January to 15
February were 19 KIA, 7 DOW, 10 MIA, 148 WIA, and 1,751 of a nonbattle
classification, largely frostbite cases soon restored to duty.[76]
[76] 1stMarDiv Periodic Operations Report (_POR_) 18 Jan-15
Feb 51, 71–159.
_New Mission for the Marines_
On 11 February, General Smith flew to Taegu to discuss the next Marine
mission with General Ridgway. The EUSAK commander spoke favorably of
employing the 1st Marine Division to relieve the 24th Infantry Division
in the critical Han River corridor, where recent UN advances had been
made. He also recognized the advantages of committing the Marines
to the east coast, so that they could be held in readiness for an
amphibious operation. A third possibility was the Yoju corridor of the
IX Corps zone (Map 1). As “the most powerful division in Korea,” said
Ridgway, “the Marines would be astride what he considered the logical
route for an expected enemy counterthrust.”[77]
[77] Smith, _Notes_, 1441–1445.
No decision was reached that day. At midnight the CCF attack
materialized; and the central front was the area of decision, as
Ridgway had predicted.
Naturally, the next mission for the Marines had to be reconsidered in
the light of this development. On 12 February EUSAK warning orders
alerted the 1st Marine Division to be prepared to move to Chungju, in
the rear area of the IX Corps front where the heaviest CCF attacks were
taking place. The Division was further directed to make an immediate
reconnaissance of the Chungju area while the 1st KMC Regiment prepared
for a move to Samchok on the east coast and attachment to the ROK
Capitol Division. The following day brought orders from the Eighth
Army to initiate these movements on 15 February 1951.[78] Thus the
Pohang-Andong guerrilla hunt came to an end with the Marines on their
way to new employment in the battle line of the Eighth Army.
[78] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51.
CHAPTER IV
Operation Killer
_The Move to the Chungju Area--Marine Planes in Action--Planning for
the New Operation--The Jump-Off on 21 February--Stiffening of Chinese
Resistance--General Smith in Command of IX Corps--The Advance to Phase
Line_ ARIZONA_--JOC Air Control System Criticized_
The CCF counterattack which began northeast of Wonju on 11 February
1951 came in reaction to the unremitting pressure exerted during
the previous month by the Eighth Army. Twice beaten during a recent
six-week period and pushed back some 200 miles, EUSAK had shown amazing
powers of recuperation.
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