By a prodigious effort, enough progress in logistics was made so that the EUSAK commanding general could issue orders on 25 February for the second phase of Operation KILLER to commence on 1 March. He made it known that he was not satisfied with results so far. The assigned physical objectives had been taken, but the enemy’s withdrawals had saved him from the full extent of the personnel and material losses Ridgway had hoped to inflict. He called on his staff officers, therefore, for plans aiming at a new operation “having the primary intent of destroying as many enemy and as much equipment as possible and, by continued pressure, allowing the enemy no time to mount a counteroffensive.”[113] A secondary mission was that of outflanking Seoul and the area between Seoul and the Imjin River, “so that this territory may be taken either by attack from the east or by enemy default.” [113] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, Sec 1, 53. The name of the new drive was to be Operation RIPPER, and it was to jump off as soon as possible after the finish of KILLER. _The Advance to Phase Line_ ARIZONA From newly won positions in the high ground south of Hoengsong, the Marines could look across the soggy plain to their Phase II objectives, the hills to the north of the battered town. Hoengsong occupied a valley at the confluence of two rain-swollen streams. Thus a triangular area of low, flat ground lay between the ruins and the hills which must be taken in the final phase of Operation KILLER. The 1st and 7th Marines were the combat units, with the 5th Marines in reserve. (The KMC Regiment, it may be recalled, had been temporarily detached for service with the ROK army.) Before the 1st and 7th Marines could launch their combined attack, the latter had to fight its way up to the point of junction after relieving elements of the 6th ROK Division.[114] The scheme of maneuver then called for Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3/1 to sideslip into the zone of Major Maurice E. Roach’s 3/7, in order to be in position for the advance across the Hoengsong plain. This meant a crossing of the river Som for 3/1 and a combined assault with 3/7 on the high ground along the west bank. [114] Except when otherwise noted, this section is derived from the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 2–5; 7thMar _HD_, Mar 51, 2–6; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_ No. 4, Mar 51, 31–32; EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sec 1, Mar 51, 53–59; LtCol Edwin H. Simmons narrative, n.d.; Comment by Col Wilbur F. Meyerhoff.