U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The problem of crossing the river, 200 feet wide and chest-deep at the
most likely site, was turned over to Banning with the explanation that
the engineer company supporting the regiment could not be diverted from
road repairs. To meet this emergency Major Edwin H. Simmons, commanding
Weapons Company of 3/1, produced a field manual with instructions for
building a “Swiss bent bridge.”[115] His Antitank Assault Platoon
was given the task under the command of energetic Technical Sergeant
Carmelo J. Randazzo, a veteran on his third enlistment.
[115] FM 70-10, _Mountain Operations_, 41–46.
There was no lack of trees for timbers, and rolls of telephone wire
were sworn to be beyond salvaging by the battalion communications
officer. The A-shaped bents, or trusses, were lashed together with wire
and enthusiasm, then carried out into the ice-cold water to be attached
to spars and stringers.
It was a great triumph for “war by the book.” Before dark on 28
February two spans, one 120 feet long and another half that length,
were linked by a sandbar in midstream. The improvised bridge stood up
well next morning when the battalion crossed to the west bank. There
3/1 echeloned itself behind 3/7, which gained the first 1,000 yards
under cover of a vigorous artillery preparation and belated air strikes.
On the left, Major James I. Glendinning’s 2d Battalion of the 7th
Marines ran into increasingly stubborn opposition from CCF mortar and
small-arms fire. Before noon the attacks of both battalions of the 7th
Marines were brought almost to a halt in difficult terrain which the
Communists had booby-trapped. Neither artillery nor air strikes had a
decisive effect against an enemy sheltered by log-covered bunkers. So
many delays were encountered that it was decided in mid-afternoon to
postpone the advance until the following morning, 2 March.
Artillery and air strikes supported 2/7, 3/7, and 3/1 as they attacked
at 0800 west of the river. Meanwhile, 1/7 patrolled on the division
left flank while maintaining contact with the 6th ROK Division.
Apparently the enemy put up a hard fight only when he could not
withdraw in time to avoid one. Resistance was light on the west bank,
and east of the river Lieutenant Colonel Allen Sutter’s 2/1, supported
by tanks, had little trouble. His battalion linked up with 3/1 in the
afternoon and dug in after taking its assigned objective, Hill 208,
with casualties of three men wounded.
The only determined opposition of 2 March took place during the
afternoon in the zone of 2/7, There the attackers could only inch
forward over rocky terrain which the enemy defended, ridge by ridge,
in spite of air strikes and 1,600 artillery rounds fired by the 11th
Marines.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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