U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
At daybreak on the 3d the men of the 1st and 7th Marines could look to
the north and see their final objectives. Five hills lay along Phase
Line ARIZONA from west to east--Hills 536 and 333 in the zone of the
7th Marines, and Hills 321, 335, and 201 in the zone of the 1st Marines.
The last two positions were in the path of 2/1, which seized them after
several brisk fire fights. Casualties of three KIA and 28 WIA were
incurred while inflicting losses of 70 counted CCF dead. The terrain
gave 3/1 more trouble than the enemy in taking Hill 321, where the CCF
troops had already begun their withdrawal.
It was in the zone of the 7th Marines that Communist resistance was
hottest. The 1st battalion was summoned to cover the regimental left
flank and aid in the attack of 2/7 on Hill 536 while 3/7 continued its
struggle for Hill 333. Both battalions had their hardest fight of the
entire operation that afternoon. They lost most of the 14 KIA and 104
WIA which the Division reported for 3 March, and the enemy still held
the topographical crests.
The 1st Marines had reached the mopping-up stage on 4 March, while the
7th Marines prepared to go up against an expected last-ditch stand
of the enemy on Hills 536 and 333. The parkas of the assault troops
were powdered with snow as the men moved out to the attack at 0800,
following an intensive artillery preparation. There was something
ominous about the silence in the objective area, but no trap had been
set for the attackers. The Communists actually had pulled out under
cover of darkness, leaving behind only enough outpost troops for
delaying operations.
Operation KILLER ended at nightfall on the 4th for the Marines, though
mopping up continued throughout the following day. Total Marine
casualties for the 8 days of fighting were 395--48 KIA, 2 MIA, and 345
WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 274 counted dead and 48 prisoners. It is
certain, however, that the actual KIA and WIA figures were much higher,
since the withdrawing Communists buried their dead and took their
wounded with them.
Any evaluation of this limited objective operation must credit it
with achieving its main purpose--keeping the Communists off balance
while they were striving desperately to make ready for another great
offensive (Map 7). This explains why the enemy as a whole put up a
half-hearted resistance. He preferred to withdraw whenever possible and
fight another day.
JOC _Air Control System Criticized_
Operation KILLER was the first real test of the JOC system as far
as the Marines were concerned, and both the flying and ground-force
Marines felt that it had shown grave shortcomings. Air support on
1 March proved so disappointing that General Puller, as temporary
commander of the 1st Marine Division, reported the situation to General
Shepherd, commanding FMFPac. His letter is quoted in part as follows:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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