Squadrons that were unable to better their performance records in some cases could trace their trouble to the inability to get all of their planes off the ground. Several models were subject to spare parts shortages.[251] New aircraft, the F3D-2s and the AU-1s received in June by VMF(N)-513 and VMA-212, respectively, had preceded an adequate stocking of normal replacements for worn out or defective parts. The night fighter squadron was handicapped also by introduction into the supply system of inadequate radio tubes, which burned out rapidly. The most critical shortage, however, was parts for starter units of jet engines. This deficiency was not corrected until summer. One problem never quite eliminated was the confusion of supply orders intended for the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6. It was believed that the close resemblance of Sikorsky HRS and HO5S part numbers and nomenclatures had caused the improperly-marked requisitions and mix-up. [251] Spare parts shortages are “inherent in the introduction of new equipment into the field and prior to the development of usage data.” a major effort was made at this time by 1st MAW to improve its critical spare parts support by improved stock control procedures and complete inventory. _Jack ltr._ The 1st Marine Division logistical situation during the summer and fall of 1952 was generally excellent. General Pollock’s units did not suffer from the shortage of spare parts experienced by the 1st MAW whose aircraft sometimes had to be grounded because of a missing spare part. U.S. Army support in the replacement of worn-out Marine vehicles for new Army ones proved satisfactory. No major problems arose in engineer support. Medical evacuation and treatment and the level of supplies in the five companies of the 1st Medical Battalion remained excellent. There were two significant changes in the logistical support provided the Marine division early in the fall. One dealt with employment of the division’s 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, located in the rear support areas. Beginning in September, the companies were placed in direct support of the four infantry regiments, with liaison by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Martin, division motor transport officer. It was believed this decentralization would have the following advantages: 1. Decreased vehicle mileage and therefore less driver fatigue and prolonged vehicle life. 2. Increased dispersal as a safeguard against loss of wheeled vehicle support in event of an unexpected and successful enemy attack. The other change was a shift in the emphasis of support rendered by the Korean Service Corps. During October, each of the three frontline regiments received 300 more laborers, raising the total to 800. Rear area units paid for the increase, since the KSCs were detached from support units and sent forward to the MLR.