U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
As in the morning’s close air support flights, Lieutenant Colonel
Cargill’s ADs provided the bulk of air support for ground action
that afternoon. Striking first a command post southeast of the 1/7
salient, at 1410, VMA-121 came back a half-hour later with four more
Skyraiders against CCF troops pressing to envelop the right flank of
the counterattack force. At 1635, two squadron aircraft flew in quickly
in response to a sighting of troops moving forward in the Samichon
tributary 1,000 yards north of the Hook. Twenty minutes after this
successful attack, four more Skyraiders attacked bunkers opposite the
left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector. The final daylight
strike for 1/7 was again made by four ADs from -121. These planes took
under attack a target that had been bombarded just 25 minutes earlier
by Corsairs from VMA-323.
Another Marine attack squadron, VMA-212, participated in the Hook
support that afternoon. At 1344, a four-plane flight assaulted troops
moving through Frisco to reinforce the Chinese drive on the Hook. Two
of the planes dropped three 1,000-pound bombs and two 250-pounders
on the enemy soldiers. The other pair of attack Corsairs released
six 780-pound napalm tanks over the position. It was estimated that
25 Chinese casualties resulted from this air attack. Wrapping up the
VMA-212 CAS for the Hook sector on the 27th was a strike, at 1440, on
camouflaged positions and another at 1520 against caves and bunkers.
Each of these air assaults took place about 950 yards from the Hook.
The earlier one was a napalm attack from 50 feet above the ground. One
of the six tanks would not release and three did not ignite. Four caves
were destroyed and one bunker was damaged in the latter strikes.
Between the morning and afternoon air strikes, the ground commanders
put together the final plans for recapture and defense of the Hook.
When General Pollock had released I/3/1 to the regiment during an
inspection trip to the 1/7 area that morning, the company was already
en route to the ridge to make the counterattack. The ground commanders
agreed that after I/3/1 regained the salient, H/3/1 would take over the
right sector of 1/7 and the relieved company, B/1/7, would then occupy
both the critical MLR sector and Warsaw. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s
scheme to recapture the positions and ground lost on 26 October was a
continuation of the attack from atop the ridge directly towards the
objective. It was to be a hard-nosed, frontal assault, but the only
maneuver deemed advisable.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account