U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The three Nevada outposts lay just below the 38th Parallel,
approximately 10 miles northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance
north of the Marine railhead at Munsan-ni. Possession of the area would
give the Communists improved observation of I Corps MLR positions
to the west. Indeed, the enemy had cast covetous eyes (an ambition
translated into action through his well-known creeping tactics) on the
semi-circular net of outposts since the preceding summer.
Mindful of this, the I Corps commanding general back in September had
stressed the importance of holding key terrain features that could be
of major tactical value to the enemy. This included Bunker Hill and
COP Reno, both considered likely targets for renewed enemy aggression
in the future. Particularly, the enemy had indicated he wanted to
annex Reno. The object of increasing hostile attacks since July 1952,
Reno was the closest of the three Nevadas to CCF lines and tied in
geographically with two of the enemy’s high ground positions--Hill 190,
to the northeast, and Hill 101, overlooking the site of the destroyed
village of Ungok. (See Map 22.)
Reno’s companion outpost on the right, Vegas, at 175 meters, was the
highest of the three while Carson, on the left flank, was nearest
JAMESTOWN and also assisted in defense of Reno and Vegas. Each of the
three outposts was manned by a rifle platoon (40 Marines plus two Navy
hospital corpsmen), heavily reinforced with weapons company personnel.
A small hill between Reno and Vegas, known as the Reno Block, further
supported the Nevada Cities complex and at night was defended by a
reinforced squad.
Since they commanded the historic Korean invasion route to Seoul, 30
air miles south, the strategic importance of the Nevada outposts had
been one of the reasons for transfer of the Marines from East Korea to
the West, in 1952. Both Reno and Vegas, moreover, overlooked Chinese
rear area supply routes. This was a matter of special concern to the
enemy at this time since he had recently doubled his stockpiling
efforts and wanted to prevent UNC intelligence from learning about the
build-up. Possession of the Nevada hills would enable the Chinese to
harass the Marines at even closer range and--hopefully--to conduct new
thrusts at the MLR which would ultimately weaken the UNC position.
[Illustration:
MAP 22 K. WHITE
5TH MARINES MLR SECTOR
26 March 1953]
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