U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Tactical control had been altered radically the previous month when
the Fifth Air Force had relinquished its command of Marine pilots and
planes and they returned to operational control of the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing for the first time since the early days of the war.
Direction of the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6 used in transport
and reconnaissance missions had for some time been closer to home;
both squadrons were under 1st Marine Division operational control.
HMR-161 was based at A-17, in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division
command post. VMO-6, a composite unit consisting of single-engine
OE-1 observation planes and a copter section of the HTL-4 and the new
larger HO5S-1 craft, was located at A-9, three miles south of division
headquarters. The squadron provided regularly scheduled helicopter
evacuation of night frontline combat-casualties, artillery spotting
flights, and airborne control of air strikes. Both squadrons performed
routine liaison and reconnaissance, administrative, and resupply
flights.
_Defense Organization on the Outposts_[361]
[361] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: 1/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR
“Cities.”
Carson (Hill 27), furthest west of the three Nevada Cities was, at 820
yards, also nearest the Marine main line of resistance. It overlooked
enemy terrain to the northwest and dominated an important approach
from that same direction--the Seoul road. Organized as a perimeter
defense position, Carson security was oriented toward two major Chinese
strongpoints. These were the twin-peaked Ungok Hill mass (31-31A),
approximately 650 yards west of the Seoul road which lay between Ungok
and Carson, and Hill 67 (Arrowhead), an equal distance due northwest.
Other critical features in the immediate Carson vicinity included, on
the right, the west finger of Reno; the ridgeline south from Reno to a
point known as “Ambush Alley,” in the vicinity of enemy Hill 47; and
the ridgeline approaches by the two listening posts--Fox finger and
George finger. (See Map 24.)
[Illustration:
MAP 24 K. WHITE
COP CARSON
March 1953]
Little cover or concealment existed, other than that offered by
the trenchline and a cave used as living quarters. Four weapons
positions--light machine guns and Browning automatic rifles--covered
main enemy avenues of approach. These and two listening posts were each
manned by two men after 1800 and throughout the night. Of Carson’s
customary strength of 38 (1 officer and 37 enlisted), 28 stood watch
and worked on fortifications at night. A six-man security team was on
duty during the day. All posts connected by land line to battalion
headquarters, where a 24-hour phone watch was maintained. Sound power
phones and radios also provided communication with the company CP.
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