U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
A major blocking position, some 100 yards south, and to the rear of
Reno itself was covered by troops posted in the trenchline. Left of the
forward trench, protective wire was placed across the topographical
crest. This left finger had good observation to Ungok and Arrowhead
but also served as an approach to Carson. Most likely enemy approach,
however, was considered to be the ridgeline from Hill 150, on the
north. The Seoul road, rear trenchline, and valley to the right were
alternate approaches. Twenty-four hour security at Reno included an
automatic rifleman at the Gate, at Post 1, on the forward trench, and
Post 2, which was at the extreme right of the rear trench. Ten machine
gunners were also detailed as night watch on the guns. During the
daytime they were responsible for maintenance of ammunition and weapons
which consisted of 18 M-1 rifles, 6 BARs, 5 A-4 LMGs, 2 flamethrowers,
1 carbine, and 7 pistols.
The biggest defense problem at Reno stemmed from restricted fields of
fire. Able gun, for instance, covered the rear of the topographical
crest and Hills 31 and 67, on the left. But dead space masked its
effectiveness practically from the base of Hill 67 to the gun itself.
The Baker gun, protecting the reverse slope, had a lateral firing range
of from 10 to 30 feet. Charlie gun maintained an unlimited sector of
fire, approximately 180 degrees, and Dog gun covered the rear. As
there were no prepared machine gun positions, they were fired from the
parapet protecting both the fighting holes and firing positions in the
trenchline. Two fighting holes were manned by BARs and two were used as
machine gun posts.
Customarily 40 to 43 men were on duty at COP Reno. In fact this number
had been viewed dubiously as being “far too many to man defensive
positions at any one time,” by the commanding officer of the 1/5
Weapons Company during a survey earlier in the month, noting that
“about 20 could adequately defend the position.”[362] A six-man force
was detailed as a permanent working party for the improvement of
fortifications. Sound power phones linked all positions and field
phones connected the forward observer with gun positions. Overall, for
proper defense, Reno depended heavily upon support fires from Carson
and Vegas, on its right flank. Morale was considered “very good to
excellent” with Reno personnel being relieved every 8 to 10 days.
[362] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Reno Report, by Capt
Henry A. Checklou, dtd 12 Mar 53, p. 4.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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