U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
By midnight the men of the 35th Infantry had beaten back the attack at
COP-2. The Turks, likewise, were still in possession of the two Berlin
(platoon-strength) outposts, but Commonwealth forces were involved in
a pitched battle at Ronson and Warsaw. The situation was even grimmer
at this time in the Nevada Cities area outposted by the TAFC. Although
the Turkish troops continued to hold Vegas, where 140 men were dug
in, Carson (two-platoon size) had fallen and Elko (platoon-strength)
was heavily besieged. Shortly thereafter, the 25th Division ordered
that the TAFC withdraw from the latter position to its own MLR. The
diversionary attack against Berlin-East Berlin had been broken off and
the twin positions were secured.
During the first six hours of the attack, the night of 28–29 May,
Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines, now under I Corps command, had sent 9,500
rounds crashing into Chinese strongpoints, while Marine air observers
directed eight missions against active enemy artillery positions.
Ripples from the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, transferred to the
Commonwealth sector to support the Hook defense, were fired on CCF
troop activity there. Another curtain of flame engulfed the Carson
intruders. When the fighting started, 15 Marine tanks were positioned
in the Turkish sector. Company B and C vehicles, under Captains James
M. Sherwood and Robert J. Post, relentlessly pounded the approaching
CCF columns, while Company D was put on a 30-minute standby. As the
action developed, additional tanks were committed until 33 were on line
at one time or another.[431]
[431] Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR
positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although
many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this
procedure, “I am forced to confess that it worked well
in that static defensive situation.” A major advantage
resulting from this change was that tanks effectively
linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and
radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out
the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was
“generally the only reliable means of communications with
the scene of action.” _Post ltr._
When savage Chinese pummeling of the 25th Division outposts continued
the following day, Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines was transferred at
1315 to operational control of I Corps. The regiment’s three infantry
battalions, antitank, and heavy mortar companies promptly moved out
from their Britannia headquarters and within two hours had relocated at
25th Division bivouac areas south of the KANSAS line in readiness for
counterattack orders. The 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company
was similarly ordered to 25th Division control to relieve a 14th
Infantry Regiment reserve company in position along the east bank Imjin
River defenses.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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