U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
As the more favorable weather for ground combat approached toward the
end of March, the CCF was well prepared to continue and expand its
operations. Enemy soldiers were considered able to defend their sector
easily with infantry and support units. Division intelligence also
reported that Chinese ground troops had the capability for launching
limited objective attacks to improve their observation of Marine MLR
rear areas.
_Initial CCF Attack_[42]
[42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52; KMC Regt
UnitRpt 31, dtd 2 Apr 52.
Whether by intent or default, the Chinese infantry occupying the enemy
forward positions did not interfere with the Marine relief. With
assumption of sector responsibility by the division early on 25 March,
the initial enemy contact came from Chinese supporting weapons. Later
that day the two division frontline regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines,
received 189 mortar and artillery shells in their sectors which wounded
10 Marines. One man in the 1st Marines was killed by sniper fire on 25
March; in the same regiment, another Marine was fatally wounded the
following day. Forward of the lines, the day after the division took
over, there was no ground action by either side.
During the rest of the month, the tempo of activities on both sides
increased. Marines began regular patrol actions to probe and ambush the
enemy. Division artillery increased its number of observed missions by
the end of the month. By this time the CCF had also begun to probe
the lines of the Marine regimental sectors. In these ground actions to
reconnoiter and test division defenses, the Chinese became increasingly
bold, with the most activity on 28 March. Between 25–31 March, the
first week on JAMESTOWN, some 100 Chinese engaged in 5 different
probing actions. Most of these were against the 1st KMC Regiment on the
left flank of the division MLR.
It was no wonder that the Chinese concentrated their effort against
the Korean Marines, for they held the area containing Freedom Gate,
the best of the three bridges spanning the Imjin. Both of the other
two, X-Ray and Widgeon, were further east in the division sector. If
the enemy could exploit a weak point in the KMC lines, he could attack
in strength, capture the bridge, and turn the division left flank,
after which he would have a direct route to Seoul.[43] Without the
bridge in the KMC sector, the division would be hard pressed, even with
helicopter lift, to maneuver or maintain the regiments north of the
Imjin.
[43] _Henderson ltr I._
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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