U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea — John Shaqi
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Two other measures to strengthen his sector of JAMESTOWN were utilized
by the Marine division commander. On 18 April, he asked General
O’Daniel to reconsider the no-fire zone recently established by the
corps commander. General Selden, who had received reports of Chinese
use of the sanctuary located within Marine Corps territory--for firing
positions and assembly areas primarily--recommended, after I Corps
had refused him permission to fire into the haven, a redrawing of the
O’Daniel line to coincide more closely with the boundaries established
by the UN. Approval along the lines submitted by the division was
given by I Corps that same day. The second measure employed by General
Selden was use of an additional defensive line, WYOMING FORWARD. This
position, closely paralleling JAMESTOWN in the KMC and 5th Marines
sectors, added depth to the sector defenses.
A unique rescue and recovery operation also came into existence about
this time. On 19 April the division ordered the 5th Marines, occupying
the center regimental sector, to organize a tank-infantry force for
rescue of the United Nations Truce Team, should such action become
necessary. The regimental plan, published on 22 April, utilized a
reinforced rifle company-tank company organization directly supported
by organic 5th Marines 4.2-inch mortars and 1/11. The Everready Rescue
Force, from the regimental reserve, occupied the high ground (OP 2)
east of and dominating Panmunjom.
In addition to setting forth organizational details of the task unit,
the 5th Marines Operational Plan 6-52 specified the method of operation
for the rescue force. Taking advantage of the peace corridor in the
western end of the center sector, a Forward Covering Force would
speed tank-riding infantry to the high ground one-half mile beyond
the objective, Panmunjon. Following would be the Pick-Up Force, from
the 1st Tank Battalion Headquarters Platoon, which would retrieve the
principal UN delegates and take them quickly to the assembly area
two miles to the rear of the MLR. A Rear Covering Force, composed of
a tank-infantry element, would follow the Pick-Up force both on its
way towards the objective and on the return trip. Withdrawal of both
covering forces was regulated by a series of phase lines.
_Marine Air Operations_[52]
[52] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section
is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10;
1st MAW, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, Apr 52; Lynn Montross,
_Cavalry of the Sky--The Story of U. S. Marine Combat
Helicopters_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954),
hereafter Montross, _SkyCav_, quoted with permission of
the publishers.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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