U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Remedial action was soon taken. Stress on flak evasion was emphasized
in pilot briefings and debriefings. The MAG-33 intelligence section
came up with a program that attempted to reduce losses by a detailed
analysis of flak information. The originator of this system, First
Lieutenant Kenneth S. Foley, based his method on:
... photo interpretation of an up-to-date flak map, scale
1:50,000, and an intelligent utilization of flak reports
disseminated by the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the
5th Air Force. Frequent briefings were given to each squadron
on the enemy AA capabilities. Elaborate overlays were drawn up
and displayed. Target maps, clearly showing AA positions and
flak clocks [danger areas], were given to flight leaders to aid
them in evading known AA guns in their target area. Through flak
analysis, the safest route to the target area was determined
and an actual attack and retirement route was suggested. These
recommendations appeared in a flak summary presented at each
combat briefing.[104]
[104] VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Jun 52, App II, p. 5. Mention of a flak
analysis program first appeared in the March 1952 records
of MAG-33. Aircraft losses on interdiction strikes (the
program was not applicable to CAS missions) dropped
for the next several months. When Lieutenant Foley
transferred to the night squadron, he took his system
with him and had it put into operation there. LtCol
Kenneth S. Foley interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24
Mar 66.
Other measures attempted to reduce mounting losses of personnel
and aircraft. In all Marine air units, evasion and escape tactics
were stressed. In addition to the FAF de-emphasis on interdiction
of communication routes that had come about, in part, due to heavy
aircraft losses, Fifth Air Force decreed that beginning 3 June, “with
the exception of the AD and F4U aircraft [1st MAW types] only one run
will be made for each type of external ordnance carried and no strafing
runs will be made.”[105] CTF 77 ordered that in all attack runs,
aircraft would pull out by the 3,000-foot altitude level. The Marines,
combining their air and ground efforts, came up with a positive program
of their own. It was to become the first known instance of Marine
ground in support of Marine air.
[105] FAF CbtOps Notam No. 6-10.1 cited in App. 9, _PacFlt
EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-199.
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