U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Traffic in the air had, quite naturally, been less affected by the
heavy rains and by the flooded, mucky terrain that was slowing ground
movement throughout the entire division area. Flight operations during
the first week of August produced a daily sortie rate that would
approximate the monthly average. In fact, the month of August was to
become the record one for 1st MAW attack and fighter pilots during
1952, with a total of 5,869 sorties flown.
While the air people in August were maintaining a good weather pace
against the enemy following the July downpours, the Communist ground
troops apparently found the going too difficult to mount any sustained
attack. The enemy merely continued his active defense, with an average
of two contacts daily, while busily engaged in advancing his OPLR
by creeping tactics. Even the usually assiduous Chinese artillery
was strangely quiet. With respect to the enemy’s excellent artillery
capability, the 1st Marine Division in July learned that the Chinese
had introduced a 132mm Russian rocket in their combat operations. The
presence of this truck-mounted launcher, the _Katusha_, which could
fire 16 rockets simultaneously, was indicated by a POW who had been
informed by “his platoon leader that there were two _Katusha_ regiments
in the CCF.”[158] In addition to this new enemy weapon, the Marine
division reported the same month that positive sightings had been
made of self-propelled guns emplaced well forward, and that there was
an “indication that these guns were being used to fire direct fire
missions from frontline revetments.”[159]
[158] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52, p. 2.
[159] _Ibid._, p. 1.
Communist forward positions were gradually encroaching on JAMESTOWN.
Since April 1952 the division had noted every month that the enemy
was continuing to extend his trenches in the direction of the Marine
MLR. The Chinese technique was to occupy key, high terrain at night,
prepare the ground during darkness by digging trenches and constructing
bunkers, and then vacate the area before daybreak. After nightly
repetitions of this process had produced a tenable position, the
enemy moved in and occupied it. By means of these creeping tactics,
the Chinese hoped to acquire the dominating terrain necessary for
controlling access to Seoul. The ultimate goal of the Communist forces
was believed to be the 750-foot-high Paekhak Hill,[160] the Marine high
ground position also known as Hill 229, just over a mile east of the
road leading to Panmunjom and Kaesong.
[160] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 18 Jun 52, in
1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 5.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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